The following is restored text from a document I unearthed from 2007, which in final form and with notes was published as an appendix in Prof. Bezalel Bar-Kochva's *The Image of the Jews in Greek Literature: The Hellenistic Period* (University of California Press, 2010), pp. 525–542.

The book may be found online at:

JSTOR – The Image of the Jews in Greek Literature

My appendix specifically may also be found there, with corrected text and all the footnotes which are missing here.

Appendix: The God of Moses in Strabo, by Ivor Ludlam.

Strabo ascribes to Moses the following description of the Jewish divinity:

> For only this one [thing] is god: that which surrounds all of us and earth and sea, [the thing] which we call both heaven and cosmos and the nature of the things-which-are.
> (XVI. 2. 35)

This quotation has been used by some scholars to support their claim that Strabo's Jewish excursus must surely have derived from Posidonius, while others have used it to prove the exact opposite. Since the arguments on both sides depend upon a comparison of the views expressed in the passage with those of Posidonius, it seems reasonable to begin our discussion with a short review of Stoic physics, of which Stoic theology is one part. I shall attempt to reconstruct and demarcate some of the views of Posidonius which seem to have differed from those of other Stoics, and which have a bearing on the opposing arguments concerning Strabo's source of information for Jewish belief.

A. Posidonian Stoic Physics

I have argued elsewhere that there was never one organized Stoic school which imposed orthodoxy upon its members. Each Stoic was at liberty to develop, within limits, Stoic theory as he saw fit, and Posidonius appears to have been no exception. My reconstruction of the aspects of Posidonian Stoic physics (including theology) relevant to the Strabo passage is based upon a consideration of the development of these aspects in Stoic physics from Zeno onwards.

A basic tenet of Stoic physics is that there is only one thing which is - i.e., one thing which does not come to be and pass away - and this is the ousia ("substance"). The many things we see in the universe are not constant, but come to be and pass away, and their existence is by virtue of the ousia, of which they are no more than ever-changing aspects. According to the Stoics, therefore, the many things of this universe cannot be called "things-which-are" (onta), and instead they are called bodies (somata). It may be observed at once that the Strabo passage as it stands is not Stoic, since it refers to things-which-are.

Bodies in Stoic terminology are not merely discrete masses of matter. The Stoics defined body as that which could affect or be affected, and conversely, anything that could affect or be affected was regarded as a body. Examples of body would be a table, a soul and bravery. More than one body could occupy the same place simultaneously. Some bodies would be aspects of other bodies, and all bodies, as has already been mentioned, were aspects of the ousia.

Stoics claimed that the ousia, although in practice indivisible, may be conceived by the intellect to consist of an active and a passive aspect. The active acts on the passive, and thereby causes the variations in the ousia which are perceived as bodies. The passive aspect was identified with unqualifed matter (hyle), and the active aspect with god (theos) or the Logos, which is best left untranslated. Since the two aspects were considered inseparable in reality (for there is no unqualified matter in the cosmos, and no unqualifying god), it was quite common to regard the ousia as either (passive) matter or (active) god as occasion demanded. The Stoics tended to identify the ousia in its material aspect with what medical practitioners considered to be the material life force. For the early Stoics, therefore, the ousia was "creative fire", but medical advances led later Stoics to identify the ousia with warm breath (pneuma). Since Posidonius was one of these later Stoics, we shall concentrate on the concept of pneuma.

Doctors had used "breath" to explain certain functions of the soul (psyche), the driving force of a living body. The early Stoics, among them Zeno and Cleanthes, while regarding the ousia as "creative fire" (the heat which provides life to living things), resorted to the concept of pneuma to explain certain phenomena of the psyche. In accordance with contemporary medical theory, these Stoics assumed that the seat of the soul was situated in the warmest part of the living body (in most cases, this was the area around the heart), and that from this seat the soul sent commands to the rest of the body. The orders were transmitted by the pneuma, warm breath pervading the whole body. Its very presence throughout the body was what allowed it to serve as a transmitter. The Stoics regarded the

whole cosmos as a living creature, and therefore attributed to it a soul. By analogy with other living bodies, the cosmic soul needed to have its seat in the warmest part of the cosmos. Cleanthes located the commanding principle of the soul and the source of the creative heat in the aither, the pure, white hot air surrounding the cosmos. The aither differed from the air surrounding the earth; part of it constituted and the rest nourished the sun and the other heavenly bodies located in it in the outer sphere of the cosmos.

This scheme of things already required the pneuma to be everywhere, in order to transmit the commands of the commanding principle. Chrysippus, the "second founder of the Stoa", adopted a more recent medical theory, according to which the life principle was no longer the creative fire but pneuma itself. For this reason, he regarded the ousia not as creative fire but as pneuma. The pneuma continued to have as one of its functions the role of transmitting the commands of the commanding principle to the rest of the body (in this case, the cosmos), but now that pneuma was identified with the ousia itself, it replaced the creative fire as the commanding principle. In practical terms there was not much difference, since Chrysippus also located the commanding principle of the cosmos in the aither. Now, however, the aither was identified with the pneuma in its purest and hottest form.

As has already been mentioned, bodies are to be regarded as no more than various aspects of the ousia. Chrysippus provided a physical explanation for the existence of bodies, and this may be summarized as follows: currents of air and pneuma (warm breath, as distinct from air) pervade the body and preserve its internal unity by means of "tension" (tonos), while also constituting the permanent state (hexis) of the body, and other characteristics such as hardness and brightness. As we shall soon see, the explanation of bodies and their characteristics by means not only of pneuma but also of air in general was problematic; but Chrysippus' very conception of pneuma itself was in need of correction.

If the ousia is the only thing that actually is (as all Stoics claim), it follows that it cannot be a compound of elements. Either the elements are things which are, in which case the ousia would not be the only thing which is, or the elements are things which are not, and that would produce an absurdity where the thing which is would be composed of things which are not. Yet the medical and Chrysippean pneuma (warm air) is essentially a compound of air and fire. Furthermore, if, as Chrysippus claimed, the pneuma (along with air) bestowed upon bodies their characteristics, their unity and their very existence, the pneuma would need to be prior to fire and air, both bodies with characteristics, unity and existence; yet fire and air, as components of the composite pneuma, need to be prior to the pneuma. It seems that Posidonius, active some four or five generations later, produced an

elegant solution to the problem of priority. While continuing to regard the ousia in its material aspect as the pneuma, he reinterpreted this pneuma as a simple material, whose purest form is prior to the four elements, fire, air, water and earth, all of which are condensed forms of pneuma. It might be objected that any one of the four usual elements could just as well be considered prior to all the others which are all rarified or condensed forms of it. Pure pneuma, however, unlike the four elements, also has a crucial role to play in the running of the cosmos, and this would have been the main reason for it being considered prior. How crucial rarified pneuma was for the running of the cosmos may be appreciated from its identification by Posidonius with god, who, according to Posidonius, is "intelligent and firelike" pneuma.

We may now turn to the further inconsistency in the theory of Chrysippus noted above, namely the claim that pneuma and air were both responsible for the existence and the characteristics of bodies. Since pneuma was no more than hot air, it was not strictly accurate to talk about pneuma and air as if they were two distinct entities. We have already seen that regarding pneuma as prior to all four elements solved the problem of pneuma itself. The same reassessment of pneuma also removed the need for air as a cause of the existence and characteristics of bodies, since pneuma alone now became responsible for the existence and characteristics of all bodies, including all four elements with their opposing characteristics.

Posidonius, then, seems to have been the first Stoic to have regarded pneuma as simple rather than compound, and to have made this pneuma the sole cause of all bodies and their characteristics, both animate and inanimate, hot and cold, hard and soft. We might say that he was more generous in his conception of pneuma than previous Stoics, who required the services of air as well to do much of the work. Posidonius' pneuma was versatile in the extreme, the cause of all things in the cosmos, including bodies of opposing characteristics. We may now appreciate that his identification of god with intelligent and firelike pneuma actually specifies which aspect of pneuma is god - pneuma when it is intelligent and firelike; that is, in its most rarified form.

There are traces in our sources of a theory in which this view of pneuma would make sense, and this theory could only be advanced by someone with the conception of pneuma which we have attributed to Posidonius. This theory, as I reconstruct it, explains how different variations of pneuma unify bodies in different ways. Every variation of pneuma provides a body with its characteristics (such as hardness and brightness), but beyond this, it also organizes a complex body in a certain overall way - and here, too, Posidonius advances on the theory of Chrysippus. Cold pneuma, for example, unifies parts into an inanimate

whole body (this pneuma is identified with the basic permanent state, hexis); warm pneuma unifies inanimate parts into a whole animate body with basic biological functions (this pneuma is identified with physis, nature); additional, warmer, pneuma, provides certain animate bodies with sensation and appetition, and unifies the whole body as an animal (this pneuma is identified with psyche, the soul); somewhat hotter pneuma can suffuse certain animals and unify the whole body as a "logical animal", e.g., a human (this pneuma is identified with logos or nous). It would seem that the place of god in this scheme is as the hottest pneuma, unifying the whole cosmos as the most intelligent animal of all.

No Stoic before Posidonius could have invented a theory which presupposes that simple (not compound) pneuma is the ousia. On the other hand, our sources indicate that Posidonius was the last of the great innovators in Stoic physics; indeed, he seems to have been considered by later excerpters and doxographers to be the repository of Stoic physics, since many of our testimonia on Stoic physics earlier than Posidonius can be traced back to his writings. All the evidence points to this pneumatic theory being Posidonian.

To conclude this discussion of Stoic physics: according to my reconstruction, the Posidonian god was identified with firelike and intelligent pneuma, the hottest of all the types of unifying pneuma. It pervaded the cosmos, unifying the cosmos as the most rational animal, and in this aspect could itself be identified with the cosmos. It also governed the cosmos, as a soul governs a body, with its seat in the hottest part of the body, whence commands issued forth, conveyed by the pneuma itself, to all parts of the body. While the hottest part of an animal is usually around the heart, in the case of the cosmos, the hottest part was the outer sphere. Thus, god pervaded the cosmos, but its ruling principle (hegemonikon) had its seat in heaven (ouranos).

B. Reinhardt, Aly, and the Debate over Strabo's Source

We return now to the passage in Strabo with which we began, describing the god of the Jews. Karl Reinhardt, the leading Posidonius scholar of the first half of the twentieth century, used this passage to support his claim that Posidonius was Strabo's source. His arguments dwelt mainly on the conception of god as the heavens surrounding us. He considered Posidonius to be the source for this part of Strabo's account although, as Reinhardt himself showed with an abundance of examples, the concept was hardly new and was not even peculiar to the Stoics. Reinhardt also faced another difficulty arising from the expression "the nature of the things-which-are". The concept of "things-which-are" (onta) is

familiar to us from the writings of philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle, but the Stoics did not use it. They always talked about bodies (somata). As we have seen, the Stoics acknowledged only one thing as having being, and this was the ousia, substance, of which all bodies (such as tables, souls, virtues) were aspects. Reinhardt seems to have believed that he could escape the difficulty by adducing parallels from Aristotle and elsewhere in which the cosmos or ouranos is identified with nature or the nature of everything. He did not,however, adduce a single Stoic parallel. The difficulty remains, and we shall see that Strabo also uses the term physis, "nature", in the sense of "essence", of "the things-which-are", and not in the Posidonian sense of the warm pneuma which unifies bodies as living organisms. It would seem from all the reasons given here that Posidonius, the Stoic philosopher, could not be Strabo's source.

It was later observed by Aly, in his monograph on Strabo, that the concept of god as the heavens surrounding us was not peculiar to Posidonius. He rejected the possibility of Posidonius being Strabo's source after comparing the passage with a Posidonian fragment which says: "god is intelligent pneuma pervading the whole ousia." Aly claimed that Posidonius saw the spirit of god pervading everything, while Strabo's source regarded the divinity as encompassing everything, which is something else entirely. There is, however, no substance to this argument. The Posidonian god does indeed pervade everything, as described in the testimonium Aly brings in support. This has also been touched upon in my reconstruction of Posidonius' pneumatic theory, where pneuma unifies what it pervades as a body of a certain type: the hottest pneuma pervades in its entirety the whole of the ousia and unifies it as the most intelligent animal (the cosmos). Yet this same pneuma in its hottest (most intelligent) and purest form is concentrated in the hottest part of the cosmos, in the aither, the outermost sphere of the cosmos, where it is the commanding principle, the hegemonikon, of the world. As already mentioned, doctors, and Stoics in their train, hypothesized that the commanding principle of an animal had its seat in the warmest part of the body, whence it pervaded and thereby controlled the entire body. By extension, the Stoics regarded the cosmos as a living body, and located the commanding principle in its hottest part. Consequently, Posidonius, too, located the commanding principle of the firelike and intelligent pneuma - pervading the cosmos and unifying it as a rational body - in the outer sphere of the cosmos, the ouranos (heaven). Since ouranos encompasses the cosmos, god as the commanding principle encompasses the cosmos. It is god as the unifying principle of the cosmos which pervades the comos.

Reinhardt, then, attempted to prove that Posidonius was Strabo's source, but actually

showed that the terms used by Strabo were far from peculiar to Posidonius; while Aly's argument against Posidonius as the source fails to take into account the complexity of Stoic, especially Posidonian, physics. The debate would seem to have reached an impasse.

C. From Narrative in Hecataeus to a Speech in Strabo

At this stage, we have brought no arguments proving conclusively that Posidonius is the source, and indeed, the phrase "the nature of the things-which-are" would seem to preclude any Stoic as the source, let alone Posidonius specifically. A closer examination of the internal structure of the passage, however, leads to some surprising results concerning the source. Here is the passage in context:

> For he [= Moses] said and taught that the Egyptians were not behaving rightly in likening the divinity to wild animals and beasts, nor the Lybians; nor were the Greeks [behaving] well, in sculpting anthropomorphic [statues]. For this one thing only is god: that which surrounds all of us and earth and sea, [the thing] which we call both heaven and cosmos and the nature of the things-which-are. Of this [thing], who in his right mind would dare to form an image similar to anything around us?
> (Strabo XVI. 2. 35)

Here, as elsewhere in Strabo's Jewish ethnography, the influence of Hecataeus of Abdera is clearly discernible. In his survey of Judaism and the Jews, Hecataeus has this to say about Moses:

> He did not set up at all any statue of gods through not believing the god to be anthropomorphic, [believing] rather that only the heaven surrounding the earth is god and lord of all.
> (Diodorus XL. 3. 4)

Two stages are easily discernible in the writing of Strabo's presentation: the main account; and a short sentence in which a writer (at some stage in the transmission) adds an explanation in his own words: "[the thing] which we call both heaven and cosmos and the nature of the things-which-are". The main account is in reported speech, following "he said and taught", and all the verbs in it are consequently in the optative. The short sentence in direct speech breaks the flow of the reported speech attributed to Moses, and its verb ("we call") is in the indicative. The verbs of the account return to the optative after this sentence, reflecting the

return to reported speech. For convenience, we shall henceforth call the main part of the account "the speech", and the short sentence "the interpolation".

Hecataeus' account was part of a narrative survey. In Strabo this has the form of a speech by Moses, given in reported speech with verbs in the optative. The speech writer was certainly not Hecataeus. Nor was he the interpolator, since, as the writer of the speech, he would not have needed to break the continuity of the speech he was composing, but could blend anything he wished to say into the speech itself, as part of the speech. We may see that the speech writer did add his own comments, e.g., in the case of his criticism of the Greeks, which now appears as a criticism made by Moses. The interpolation, therefore, was added to the text after Hecataeus' original account had been cast into the form of a speech. The speech itself (in reported speech) was the work of an intermediate source, and the interpolation may either have been the work of an intermediate source, or the work of Strabo himself. That Strabo was the interpolator is not only a more economical hypothesis, but there is also strong circumstantial evidence to support it, as we shall soon see. We shall therefore consider the speech writer to be the only intermediate source.

How did the speech writer utilize the account by Hecataeus? Beyond basing a speech by Moses on it, we find several differences in detail. Moses no longer finds fault only with the worship of anthropomorphic gods, but also with the representation of gods in the form of animals; the targets of his criticism are made explicit (the Greeks, and the Egyptians and Lybians, respectively); god no longer encompasses only the earth, but "all of us and earth and sea". Furthermore, while Hecataeus identifies god with the surrounding heaven (both masculine), Strabo's account identifies both god and heaven separately with "that which surrounds" (neuter). This expresses a change of emphasis, from god as a masculine concrete individual (albeit not in the shape of a man), to god as something more impersonal if not less of a concrete individual per se. We should note that, in Strabo's account, the word "heaven" does not appear in the speech itself, but in the interpolation. We shall return to this point later in the discussion.

D. The Identity and Motives of the Interpolator and the Intermediate Source

(1)
The Identity of the Interpolator

It is now time to ask a number of mutually dependent questions. Who added the interpolation? What do the terms comprising it signify? If we can show that the argument of

the speech cannot stand without the interpolation, it would appear that the interpolation has replaced part of the speech. If this is so, what did the interpolation replace?

As already mentioned, there seems to me no sufficient reason to assume the existence of two intermediate sources between Hecataeus and Strabo to explain both the existence of the speech and the interpolation. That is, an intermediate author recast Hecataeus in the form of a speech, and Strabo added the interpolation. It might be objected that the interpolation includes terms which are not Stoic, such as the expression "the nature of the things-which-are", and since Strabo was a Stoic, the interpolation could not be by him. While it is true that Strabo portrayed himself as a Stoic, it is also true that he could regard himself as a Stoic and yet not bother too much with the details of Stoic doctrine. In his time it was already customary for a man wishing to appear cultivated to finish his education by doing the rounds of the philosophical schools. He would attend the courses of teachers from the various schools, and finally choose which school best suited his purposes. Standard Stoic doctrine is in fact alien to some of Strabo's concerns - for example, his desire to include in his "colossal" work not only the beneficial and the noteworthy, but also the pleasurable (I. 1. 23). There is no doubt that Strabo had had a taste of Stoic education, but he mentions none of his Stoic teachers by name. This may not strike anyone as unusual until it is pointed out that Strabo does mention, and mention more than once or twice, his Peripatetic studies, and names at least one of his Peripatetic teachers. We learn by the way that he studied the writings of Aristotle (XVI. 2. 24), perhaps with his Peripatetic teacher, Xenarchus, and most probably in Rome (XIV. 5. 4).

Could it be, then, as a result of his Peripatetic education, that Strabo himself wrote "[the thing] which we call both heaven and cosmos and the nature of the things-which-are"? This is no doubt possible; but the general education of his day would have sufficed. Aristotle himself observes that people - not necessarily philosophers - use the words "heaven", "cosmos" and "nature", in various senses according to the context, but all three are identical only in one sense. In his work On Heaven, Aristotle notes that "heaven" and "cosmos" are identical when they mean "the general composition of everything" (where "everything" has the sense of "the universe"). In his discussion of the definitions of the term "nature" in the Metaphysics, Aristotle says that one of the meanings people attribute to it is "the elements of those things which are by nature" (pertaining to one or more of the four elements); another meaning is "the being (ousia) of those things-which-are by nature" (1014b31ff.). So the three terms "heaven", "cosmos" and "the nature of the things-which-are" can all denote in popular parlance the sum of all things (i.e., the universe), and it is only as the universe that they all

share a particular meaning. Interestingly, none of these terms is identified by Aristotle with his notion of god; but this has no bearing on the argument which appears in Strabo's account. Firstly, it is said there that Moses identified god with "that which surrounds", and it is "that which surrounds" (not god) which is identified with the following three terms in the interpolation. Secondly, Aristotle himself testifies to the identification made in common language between "heaven", "cosmos" and "the nature of the things-which-are". Strabo, then, is not using these terms in a manifestly Peripatetic sense, and is certainly not thinking of Aristotle's unmoved mover; it is most likely that he chose to use these terms according to common, non-technical, usage. We must now examine Strabo's motives for doing so.

We have already seen that the intermediate source formulated the theological opinions of Moses in the form of a speech, in reported speech, with main verbs appearing in the optative and later in the infinitive. We have also seen that the interpolation, appearing in the indicative, breaks this structure, and appears to be adding an explanation or an elucidation: "[the thing] which we call both heaven and cosmos and the nature of the things-which-are". Yet the interpolation is not a simple addition to the speech. The interpolation has replaced something in the speech. One of the terms originally appearing in the speech would have been ouranos, "heaven", since this appears in Hecataeus (the source upon which the speech is based), and in the interpolation. Strabo saw this in his source and used it in his interpolation. Hecataeus described heaven as surrounding the earth, and it is clear that the original speech included an identification between "that which surrounds" and heaven. Strabo's interpolation identifies heaven on the one hand with "that which surrounds" and on the other hand with the nature of the things-which-are, the sum of everything in common parlance. The Hecataean account is sufficient to explain the identification with "that which surrounds". Was there something else in the original speech of the intermediate source which induced Strabo to understand heaven also in the sense of "the general composition of everything"? If there was, why would Strabo have bothered to replace it with his interpolation which effectively creates a contradiction between "that which surrounds" and "the nature of things-which-are"?

(2)

What the Interpolation Replaced in the Intermediate Source

The intermediate source must have made some sort of connection between "that which surrounds" and "the sum of everything". The only philosophical system in which heaven could be simultaneously (but in different aspects) "that which surrounds", the whole cosmos, and everything in it, would have been the system of Posidonius. According to my

reconstruction presented earlier, Posidonius regarded the purest, hottest and most active pneuma as the factor unifying the cosmos as a rational animal, doing so by pervading every part of the cosmos. He also regarded this same pure pneuma pervading the cosmos as controlling the cosmos from its natural seat in the cosmos, the hottest part of the cosmos, the outer sphere, namely ouranos (heaven). We should note that in Hecataeus, "heaven" appears before "god", while in Strabo it appears afterwards, at the head of a list of terms describing god. The transposition would have been made by the intermediate source. It seems reasonable to suppose that the Stoic author of the speech wished to identify the god of Moses (as portrayed by Hecataeus) with the Stoic (Posidonian) god, and it was this which led to the change in places: "heaven", common to the Stoic and the Mosaic god, could head the list of Stoic terms describing god (now also attributed to the Mosaic god). It seems that the original speech would have contained a list of terms and expressions describing this god, since the aim was to indicate the folly of belief in anthropomorphic gods. An argument proving the non-anthropomorphic nature of god would have achieved this aim as well, but would have been too long and technical in any speech, and incongruous in this one, where such arguments are notably absent. I present a partial reconstruction exempli gratia of this part of the original speech, with the words in square brackets representing that part of the original text which has been replaced by the interpolation. The terms I propose show how the Mosaic god of the outer sphere could gradually come to be identified with the cosmos altogether. We can only speculate on the number and nature of the terms which have been replaced by the interpolation. I present the bare terms, with no attempt at reconstructing the actual formulation.

> εἴη γὰρ ἓν τοῦτο μόνον θεὸς τὸ περιέχον ἡμᾶς ἅπαντας καὶ γῆν καὶ θάλατταν, [ὁ οὐρανός, τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, πνεῦμα νοερὸν καὶ πυρῶδες, ὁ κόσμος]. τούτου δὴ τίς ἂν εἰκόνα πλάττειν θαρρήσειε νοῦν ἔχων ὁμοίαν τινὶ τῶν παρ᾽ ἡμῖν…

For this one thing only is god: that which surrounds all of us and earth and sea, [(namely) heaven, the commanding principle, intelligent and firelike pneuma, the cosmos] Of this [thing], who in his right mind would dare to form an image similar to anything around us?

(3)

The Motives of the Interpolator

Strabo appears to have replaced the list he saw in his source (not necessarily identical to the one I have proposed here) with another list free of philosophical jargon. We have

already seen that the terms he uses are not even peculiar to Peripatetic philosophy. When Strabo, in his interpolation, says "what we call", he does not mean "we, the Stoics", but "we, speakers of everyday Greek", and he is making a direct appeal to his readers. The speech at this point was clearly too technical for Strabo's taste, but some sort of list was necessary - even Strabo could see that - to show the folly of worshipping anthropomorphic gods. Terms such as "heaven", "cosmos" and pneuma, which I suggest may have appeared in the original speech, allowed Strabo to conclude that the subject was the all-pervading god - despite the previous sentence in which the god was explicitly all-encompassing - and Strabo duly wrote in non-technical language "what we call heaven and cosmos and the nature of the things-which-are", terms which are all identical only in the sense of "the sum of everything", as we have seen above. The very attempt to substitute non-Stoic terms for Stoic ones, or to use terms in a non-Stoic sense, demonstrates that Strabo was unaware of the dynamic nature of the list and its intended aim to portray god as both all-encompassing and all-pervading. Such a portrayal was impossible in anything but Stoic terms, and in non-Stoic terms necessarily led to contradiction. Perhaps Strabo assumed that such a contradiction already existed in his source (imperfectly understanding Stoic physics), and made the best of a bad job by at least demystifying the technical jargon.

What did Strabo have against Stoic terminology, especially considering that he fancied himself to be a Stoic? Why did he not understand Stoic theology? Strabo seems to have been no different from many intellectuals of his time in his distaste for physical speculations. His criticisms on this subject are directed in particular against Posidonius (II. 3. 8):

> So much against Posidonius as well [for now; for] many [of his opinions], as many as are on geography, receive the treatment appropriate to particular [discussions]. As many [of his opinions] as are more to do with physics, they are to be examined elsewhere, or not even considered; for there is much study of causes (to aitiologikon) in [his work], and Aristotelizing, from which our people [i.e., the Stoics!] lean away, because of the concealment of causes.

Some have interpreted this passage of Strabo as an attack on Posidonius for turning towards the philosophy of Aristotle. This is unlikely, since Posidonius did not in fact adopt Peripatetic physics, or anything like it. After praising Posidonius for his contributions to the study of geography, Strabo criticizes his physics, and particularly his tendency to seek out causes and

philosophize in the style of Aristotle. Now, to seek out causes and to philosophize in the style of Aristotle are not two separate criticisms, but one and the same. Strabo is here using the common rhetorical figure of hendiadys, the presentation of one idea through the medium of two expressions. In other words, Strabo is protesting against the attempts of Posidonius to look for causes in the way that Aristotle does. The criticism, therefore, is not against the opinions of Posidonius, but against his method of enquiry in this field. This is not the place to consider whether this criticism has any foundation, but it is worth spending a few moments to survey the contents of this field of Stoic physics. In a passage which is generally accepted to derive from Posidonius, Diogenes Laertius tells us that one of the divisions of Stoic physics was into three parts: 1. On the cosmos (e.g., observation of the heavens); 2. on elements (e.g., speculation concerning the composition of the cosmos and its parts; 3. on causes(aitiologikos topos - e.g., biological questions such as the nature of the ruling principle - to hegemonikon - in the soul; events in the soul; seeds; the sources of phaenomena in nature; sight).

If Strabo opposed the studies of Posidonius in the field of causes of things, he may well have opposed some of the causes peculiar to Posidonius, such as the central Stoic concept of the ruling principle in its Posidonian form - or at least to its use in the context of the cosmos. This concept must have featured in the Posidonian list of terms describing god, since it is a necessary bridge between the Hecataean all-encompassing god of Moses, and the all-pervading god which is another aspect of the same thing in the Posidonian account. Strabo was clearly not at home in Stoic physics. He failed to appreciate the importance of physics as the basis for Stoic ethics, and seems to have had little interest in it. This attitude reflects the general atmosphere of his time. As he himself says, "our people" refrain from such speculations (II. 3. 8).

(4)

The Identity of the Intermediate Source

It remains only to determine the identity of the Stoic author of the speech of Moses in the intermediate source. Only one candidate has made his presence felt throughout this discussion, and that is Posidonius:

a. The author identifies god with the all-encompassing heaven and the whole cosmos at one and the same time. This suggests a Stoic author who not only established heaven - the outer sphere of aither - as the seat of the ruling principle of the cosmos, but also regarded the material of the ruling principle as the highest form of unifier, providing the cosmos with its being, in the form of the most rational animal. This material, therefore, may be regarded not

only as the ruling principle of the cosmos, but as the cosmos itself. Later testimonia which attribute such a view to Chrysippus and even Zeno must be regarded as suspect; only Posidonius had a system in which such a position could be maintained. Thus Posidonius must be regarded as the source for these testimonia.

b. Posidonius discussed the concept of the ruling principle in that part of Stoic physics which dealt with causes, a part of Stoic physics which was peculiar to Posidonius. We have seen that Strabo was not happy with Posidonius' enquiry into causes. Therefore, when Strabo encountered the ruling principle in the speech supposedly delivered by Moses - and we have seen that the the concept had to appear there - he had at least one good reason to replace the term with something less technical.

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The Motives of the Intermediate Source

To conclude this discussion, we may ask what purpose Posidonius may have had in attributing such a speech to Moses. The additions made by Posidonius to the description of the Jewish god in Hecataeus suggest that he used the character of the Jewish leader as a mouthpiece through which he could express his Stoic views and attack positions widely held in the Greek world, on the sensitive issue of the nature of religion.

The speech of Moses, therefore, teaches us nothing about the way Posidonius understood the Jewish divinity, but only about his own religious conception and his struggles with his Greek contemporaries. His Greek contemporary reader, however, may well have treated the work as a true account of the god of the Jews.