




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
Chapter Six

The Digression

REFLECTIONS

The previous chapter has examined some of the ways in which Socrates manipulates and exploits his interlocutors' opinions. As for motives, we have seen that Socrates allows himself to appear to be persuaded by others while actually causing them to act in certain predictable ways. While thus engineering and conducting the conversation, Socrates produces deceptions similar to those made by other psychic aristocrats (such as poets and the fathers of timocrats), who exploit the opinions of degenerate psychic types in an attempt to make them behave better even if for the wrong reasons. Socrates, however, treats this educational approach as a secondary option. In this chapter we shall see that his primary objective in adapting the conversation to his interlocutors' opinions is to heal, not simply manipulate, the degenerate souls of his interlocutors.

The process is alluded to extensively by Socrates himself in Books VI–VII; but the very use of the process throughout the dialogue precludes a systematic or accurate exposition of it, even when it itself is the subject of discussion. It is best learned, or indeed, can only be learned, by observing Socrates, the proponent of this process, in action. What the process is will become clearer throughout the chapter, but it already needs to be said that the process requires Socrates to adapt himself to the opinions and expectations of his timocratic interlocutors, Glauco and Adimantus, if he is to lead them towards spiritual health; because of this, he is not at liberty to explain what he is doing in a straightforward fashion. The very analogies pertaining to epistemology, reality and appearance, and the Good itself, the bedrock of Platonic philosophy, are told by Socrates to interlocutors who are less than sane, and he accordingly blends into his account their notions and expecta-



tions in order to lead them, in the best case, to dialectic thought, or, in the second-best tradition of conventional aristocratic education, to appropriate behavior albeit for the wrong reasons.

It is not the first time that we have encountered a less than perfect exposition. The accounts of the various types of souls (with their political analogies) which Socrates provides in Books II–IV and VIII–IX have proved to be sparing with the truth and not entirely trustworthy. The exposition has been tailored to the opinions and expectations of Socrates' timocratic interlocutors. We have become aware of the deficient nature of the exposition by comparing these accounts with their model counterparts, the characters participating in the dialogue; at the same time, without the accounts, it would have been impossible to see the characters for what they are, namely extreme, clear-cut models (not mere random examples) of various types of psychic constitutions.¹ The models, rather than the accounts, are the dramatic reality of the dialogue. Comparing the models with the expositions is a requirement of the dialectic method of Socrates, the narrator of this dialogue. Similarly, Socratic behavior rather than the account of dialectic dramatizes the reality of dialectic in this dialogue, but the account of dialectic indicates some of the important features worth looking for in the interplay between Socrates and his interlocutors.

Books II–IX portray Socrates in discussion with Glauco and Adimantus for the most part. It follows that, for most of the dialogue, Socrates adapts himself to timocratic assumptions and expectations, and these adaptations persist even during his presentation of the dialectic process in Books VI–VII.² This does not mean that, deprived of Plato's account of dialectic, we should throw our arms up in despair. The dialogue itself, from Socrates' descent to Piraeus at the outset to the closing Myth of Er, is a model of the very dialectic process expounded so imperfectly (imperfectly by dialectic necessity) in the dialogue.³ The analogies, no matter how imperfect, suggest the questions we should ask about the dramatic reality of the dialogue. The shadows on the wall represent opinions cast by opinion formers holding up models. The captives in the cave are all therefore reacting to the same opinions. Does this mean that all the characters in the dialogue share the same opinions? Or do the different types react differently to the same opinions that they are all fed? This is most likely, since Socrates the narrated is supplying all the other types the same opinions, although he is directing his attention mainly at the timocrats, and none of the types is transformed into another type. The captives struggle against the philosopher attempting to release them from their bonds; do the characters helped by Socrates react in a similar way? By such questions we should eventually be able to understand what Socrates and the other characters are doing in the dialogue with regard to the dialectic process.





This chapter provides an outline of Socrates' attempts in Books V–VII to cause his timocratic interlocutors to begin to think dialectically through the use of their opinions and expectations. I shall begin, however, with a recapitulation of the timocratic challenge, and a closer examination of the transition from the simple to the tripartite polis, all in Book II, in order to identify the main strands of the timocratic bias which go on to pervert the account of the dialectic process itself.

THE TIMOCRATIC CHALLENGE REVISITED

The timocratic challenge of Book II is set up by Socrates in Book I, where Socrates exploits Glauco's timocratic upward-looking tendencies to have him become the master of ceremonies and be identified with the opposition to Thrasymachus (p. 140). By the end of Book I, Socrates has soundly defeated Thrasymachus (eristically) in all but the formal refutation, but he expresses his dissatisfaction with the second of Thrasymachus' two main theses,⁴ and so ruins the impression that Thrasymachus has in fact been defeated. Glauco is left with no choice but to require Socrates to refute Thrasymachus properly. Socrates knows how Glauco will require this to be done, since a timocrat, while enjoying competitions, prefers watching them if they are of an intellectual nature. This timocrat therefore predictably sets up a new eristic contest between Socrates and Thrasymachus, publicly desiring Socrates to defeat Thrasymachus' usual position which, secretly, both timocrats find enticing. Glauco concentrates on the position Thrasymachus presents to timocrats such as himself in which injustice is seen to be preferable to justice, while Adimantus in his equally predictable rival speech concentrates on the parental/poetic education in favor of justice which timocrats increasingly grow to resent, as detailed by Socrates in his accounts of the changeling in Book VII (p. 157), and of timocrats in Book VIII (p. 107).

Glauco begins his presentation of Thrasymachus' usual account by asking Socrates to place justice in one of three types of goods (II.357a–d2) as we have already seen. We may present them as follows: (1) pleasurable (good in themselves); (2) both pleasurable (good in themselves) and beneficial (good for their results); (3) beneficial (good for their results), but painful/laborious and done only for wages and other consequences. Glauco seems to be repeating Thrasymachus' own sophistic presentation.⁵ Glauco will go on to say that the Many regard justice as of the painful/laborious type (he should strictly have called it the beneficial type), and Socrates then observes that Thrasymachus has for a long time criticized justice for being of that sort (358a4–8).

Fully aware of Thrasymachus' usual position that injustice, not justice, is good both in itself and for its results (a7–8), Socrates places justice in this same extreme category, declaring justice to be of the finest type, good both in




itself and for its results (a1–3). It is not necessarily the case that Socrates actually believes justice to be pleasurable and therefore good, as well as beneficial and therefore good. As the designated defender of justice in an envisaged eristic debate, it is only to be expected that Socrates would adopt the position diametrically opposed to that of Thrasymachus (i.e., it is not injustice but justice that is good both for itself and for its consequences).

Thrasymachus in the past and Socrates in the present attempt to persuade the timocrat on several fronts. Reputation is always at the forefront of the timocratic mind. The timocratic challenge is concerned with the opinion of the Many, and the Many are concerned with what is pleasurable and profitable. The timocrats pretend to refer to the opinion of the Many, and not their own, since they prefer to keep secret their own desire for pleasure. Thrasymachus argues that the Many actually, if covertly, admire injustice while overtly supporting justice; this line of reasoning should weaken the timocratic resolve to appear just to the Many, if indeed the Many do not really admire justice. Socrates attempts to undermine the perceived importance of the opinion of the Many both by enlisting the timocrats as fellow leaders and law-makers in the aristocratic polis and by contrasting the virtuous philosopher in Book VI with the monstrous Many; at the same time, he will go on to provide apparent proofs in Book IX that the just man's life is better than that of the unjust man because justice is not only beneficial but also pleasurable, which is playing to the secret desire of the timocrat for pleasure, while at the same time appearing to be a decisive victory over Thrasymachus, for which the timocrats may take credit.

Thrasymachus and Socrates also play to the timocratic desire for power: Thrasymachus does this by claiming that justice holds back the naturally strong, while injustice is the natural aggrandizing of the strong at the expense of the weak; Socrates will entice the timocrats by equating the philosopher with the just ruler, the one who deserves to govern for the benefit of all.

Glauco's challenge emphasizes Thrasymachus' preference for injustice over justice, and requires Socrates to champion justice as a good in itself (pleasurable) without reference to the goods perceived to accompany it, such as honors and a good reputation (the usual timocratic preoccupation). It is this concern with reputation which requires the timocrat to behave justly when there are witnesses, despite the timocratic attraction from afar to pleasurable injustice. Adimantus' challenge draws attention to the sources for the (manifestly false) promise of good resulting from upholding justice: these deceitful authorities are the (conventional aristocratic) fathers and poets. Both Thrasymachus and Socrates play to the resentment of the timocrats. Thrasymachus argues that anyone without witnesses (with the ring of invisibility) will prefer to commit injustice rather than remain just, and apparently suggests that certain authority figures are to blame for restraining the naturally strong. Socrates will react by locating justice in the healthy soul, where






justice must, by association with health, be more pleasurable than injustice, and where witnesses are irrelevant; Socrates will also remove parents and unsavory poets from the communal state, thereby allowing the timocrats to identify with the rulers of the new city: we have seen that the fabrications they (with Socrates) devise are much worse than the former fabrications, but the timocrats have become their own authority figures and do not resent themselves.

The timocratic challenge formally sets up an eristic contest. Socrates, however, exploits his role as the champion of justice to describe not only the just man and the most unjust man, as would have sufficed in an eristic debate, but also other types between these two extremes. A formal eristic debate would have obliged Socrates to argue with Thrasymachus, but instead, he spends a great deal of time before the final refutation of the Thrasymachean position not arguing against anything, but talking about the constitutions of the various psychic types, and he does this not with Thrasymachus, but with the two timocrats: this is the reason for the apparent change in style, from that of the “early dialogue” in Book I (where Socrates actually adapts himself to oligarchic, democratic, and tyrannical interlocutors) to that of the “middle dialogue” in Books II–IX (where Socrates actually adapts himself to his timocratic interlocutors).

Persuading the timocrats with eristic arguments would be akin to the attempts by the aristocratic fathers and poets to influence degenerate types to behave better without actually changing their constitutions. Books II to IX, however, contain far more than is necessary for the refutations in Book IX. Books II–V and VIII–IX serve as a background for the project of higher education outlined in Books VI–VII. The accounts of the various constitutions purportedly explain the proper function of each part of the soul, and what happens when they do not fulfil their proper function. Each constitution in Book VIII is presented as a degeneration of the previous constitution, and the process of degeneration is also outlined. This degeneration is something the models *per se* cannot dramatize, since models are unchanging in their constitution.

The program of higher education in Books VI–VII purportedly explains how the appropriate leader (the philosopher-king = *logistikos*) is to be installed, thus completing the aristocratic constitution. It is interesting that this program appears before any of the degenerate constitutions have been considered, and that the education and selection process as it is described would work only in the context of the aristocratic constitution. Can only those with an aristocratic constitution in the first place hope to profit from higher education? On the face of it, this would help to explain why Socrates fails to educate anyone in this dialogue, since none of them has an aristocratic constitution, although it is precisely because they do not have an aristocratic constitution that they need to be educated (the technical explanation for his appar-




ent failure is the need for models to remain consistent and unchanging). Interestingly, the degenerate constitutions share their lack of higher education with the simple city which Socrates regards as healthy and true. Much, then, still needs to be explained.

THE TRANSITION FROM SIMPLE TO TRIPARTITE POLIS

The transition from simple to tripartite polis poses several interesting problems, but before considering them, it is worth seeing how Socrates manipulates the two timocrats into allowing him to present first the simple city, and then the city which is to become the aristocratic one.

Immediately after the two speeches by Glauco and Adimantus, Socrates praises the two brothers with the aid of the poem composed in their honor by Glauco's lover (368a1–7, p. 104). Although he thereby locks the two into the conversation with him, he at first feigns an unwillingness to take on the difficult task demanded by their challenge. "Glauco and the others" (c4) urge him to take up the argument. They want Socrates to track down the nature of justice (*dikaïosunē*) and injustice and the truth about their benefit. Socrates subsequently suggests that their search could be like the following analogy: if some weak-sighted people were told to read small letters at a distance, and if someone were to realize that the same letters appeared in larger form elsewhere, they could read the larger letters before examining the smaller. Glauco, however, despite being the only one of the audience to be mentioned by name, does not become Socrates' first interlocutor in this search for justice; instead, it is his timocratic rival, Adimantus, who intervenes, apparently curious to know what sort of search for justice (*to dikaion*) Socrates proposes (d8–e1). We may note that Adimantus the downward-looking timocrat is more of an appropriate interlocutor than Glauco the upward-looking timocrat in the construction of the simple city, whose inhabitants superficially have more in common with the likes of Cephalus and Polemarchus than with Socrates. This point will be expanded upon very soon.

Socrates suggests that it would be worth seeking justice in something large (the city) before looking for it in something small (the man). Adimantus enthusiastically accepts this false notion (369a4).⁶ Timocratic intellectual passivity is clearly to be seen here; the weak-sighted must rely on the keen-sighted person who tells them that the large letters are, apart from their size, identical to the small letters they have been told to read. Adimantus would appear to be prepared to accept the putatively keen-sighted Socrates' determination that the justice found in the city is identical in all respects apart from size to the justice found in an individual man. Size, of course, is not Socrates' real reason for the city-soul analogy; his aim is to illustrate the tripartite nature of the soul, which is usually considered a single entity. This






difficult concept is more easily grasped using the analogy of tripartite cities, not because cities are bigger than souls, but because the complexity of cities is a commonplace. Even so, the complex nature of psychic aspects is concealed by a somewhat simplistic presentation of social strata. As I have argued earlier (pp. 62–63), Socrates creates unreal political constitutions which reflect the (dramatically) real psychic tripartite constitutions embodied in the model characters of the dialogue.

Complexity is apparently essential for the discovery of justice and injustice. It is only in the tripartite aristocratic constitution that the four cardinal virtues, including justice, are eventually found, and only in the degenerate tripartite constitutions that the corresponding vices are found. Even so, Socrates does not proceed to the tripartite city immediately, but constructs, with the aid of Adimantus, a simple city. The downward-looking timocrat makes Socrates' task easier than it would have been with the upward-looking timocrat. Without our entering too much into details, Adimantus agrees that the simple city would get by with a minimum of craftsmen cooperating with each other, and with a number of tradesmen and merchants to facilitate the exchange of goods.⁷ When Socrates asks whether the city is complete, Adimantus replies, "Perhaps" (371e11), indicating some hesitation. Glauco will be less hesitant in his criticism.

Socrates is now in a position to ask Adimantus where justice (*dikaiosunē*) is in the city (e12–13). Adimantus replies that perhaps it is to be found in the mutual dealings of the inhabitants. Socrates' emphasis on the need for certain crafts which happen to be money-making enterprises once money is introduced, and the need for commerce to facilitate the exchange of goods between the specialist craftsmen, seems to have ensured the construction of a city reflecting only the desire-dominated notions of justice. The simple city so construed might seem designed to aid the Thrasymachean (tyrannical) claim that justice (*dikaiosunē*) is the characteristic of one who is too weak to exploit financial contracts (oligarchic *dikaion*, p. 131) and partnerships (democratic *dikaion*, p. 134) to his own advantage. This city is full of money-makers who could be exploited by unjust individuals in its midst. The simple city, however, is never used in an argument either for or against the Thrasymachean position. Socrates clearly has no desire to use the simple city for the discovery of cardinal virtues since he now engineers the transition to the complex tripartite city.


Socrates claims that he is about to examine whether Adimantus is right to locate justice in the mutual dealings among the inhabitants by seeing how they live their lives (372a3–4). What he really goes on to do is bait Glauco into protesting at the standards of civilization in the city. Socrates does this by presenting a very rustic picture, more a village than a city: hard work, simple food, and basic pleasures, with particular emphasis on the inhabitants' eating habits.⁸ Glauco protests at the simplicity of the feasts Socrates de-



scribes. Socrates adds yet more basic foodstuffs, and then notes that the inhabitants would live in peace and good health, reaching an old age and transmitting the same lifestyle to their descendants. The list of basic foodstuffs has the desired effect, and Glauco exclaims that if they had been setting up a city for pigs, they would not have arranged it any differently (d4–5). On further prompting, Glauco would like to see the diners enjoy furniture and modern dishes (d7–e1). His objection to the city would seem to be that it is too uncivilized or rustic, and inappropriate for men such as himself, who aspire to be more than mere animals. While the sentiment is laudable, the timocrat’s *logos*, which is precisely what distinguishes humans from other animals, is in the service of the *thumos*, and it calculates how the timocrat is not to be, but to appear, good. The motivation for Glauco’s desire for furniture and modern dishes is not primarily physical pleasure, but a belief that these are to be expected of civilized humans.

It is at this point that Socrates makes his judgement in favor of the simple city (p. 62). He begins by saying that he understands: they are examining not how to build a city, but a spoilt city (e2–3). He immediately goes on to say that this might not be a bad thing, since by examining this spoilt city they might find where justice and injustice come to be in cities (e3–6). Socrates declares that in his opinion the first city is real/true and healthy; but he is prepared for them to examine a feverish city too, “if you (pl.) wish.” Note the address to the audience in general. Socrates then returns to Glauco but again refers to “some” who will not be satisfied with the account of the way of life in the first city (372e6–373a2). Socrates has no interest in shaming Glauco publicly by criticizing the city Glauco himself prefers. I suggest that Socrates wishes to attribute the fevered city to the Many rather than Glauco personally, thereby allowing Glauco to present himself once again as the spokesman for the views of others, just as he presented the Thrasymachean position he secretly sympathizes with in order to hear Socrates refute it. In this way, the conversation can continue with the full cooperation of Glauco.




Socrates now lists what will be required in a civilized city as Glauco has conceived it, including furniture, sophisticated dishes, escort girls, more ornamental dwellings and clothing, and new materials such as gold and ivory. The mention of certain items between two types of food (“boiled meats, perfumes, incense, escort girls, cakes,” a3–4) suggests that Socrates is still concentrating on the primary objection Glauco had, which was the dull nature of the meals. All of the improvements Socrates adds may indeed pertain primarily to mealtime, but once Glauco has agreed to these (b1), Socrates branches out into all forms of civic entertainment and luxury, and introduces, among others, the mimics in art (painters, sculptors, etc.) and in “music”⁹ (poets, rhapsodes, actors, dancers, etc.). The list ends with professionals in the food industry, required to take care of the more exotic (and less healthy) dishes expected of a civilized, modern city (especially, I would add, in the



higher echelons of society). Glauco accepts all of these additions to the city (c8). Socrates adds that more doctors will be required, because of the less healthy lifestyle, and Glauco agrees without hesitation (d1–3). We may observe that the pleasures of the simple city reflect those of the oligarch, while the pleasures of the fevered city reflect those of the democrat.¹⁰

Just as he has attempted to distance Glauco from the luxuries now being introduced, Socrates will also attempt to dissociate Glauco from pleasures and material wealth later on, especially with the description of the lifestyle of the soldiers (superior to the money-makers), which is one of duty and abstinence.¹¹ The soldiers will represent the *thumos* in the political analogy,¹² and will also represent the virtue of courage.¹³ Their main functions in the fully formed aristocratic city are to ensure that order is maintained, that the guardians' laws are enforced, and, in Books VI–VII, to act as a pool from which new guardians may be drawn. It is instructive, therefore, to note how Socrates introduces the soldiers into the city. It is because of the fever of the city, its demands for excess and luxury, that the city requires soldiers. They are introduced to increase the territory of the city at the expense of neighboring cities, and to defend against neighboring cities attempting to expand their territories. Socrates then states that without judging whether war is a good or a bad thing, they have found its origin (d7–e5). Glauco naturally agrees, but we may have expected someone following the main point of the whole discussion to raise a question about where this is going. Taking more territory at the expense of other cities is a clear and extreme act of *pleonexia*, which in Book I was identified with injustice. Where will justice be found in a city founded on injustice? Glauco is not to know that by the time the aristocratic city is called good, the guardians are already ensuring that its population is limited, and the soldiers are no longer fighting to increase the city's territory.¹⁴

We have just seen how Socrates manipulates the two timocrats into accepting first a simple city and then what eventually becomes the aristocratic city. Adimantus the downward-looking timocrat cannot but accept that a city requires craftsmen and traders. Glauco the upward-looking timocrat demands a greater degree of civilization as befits humans, but his notions of superiority extend no further than genteel material and sensual pleasures, by possessing which he may appear superior. Socrates suggests that warfare arises out of the need to support these less essential needs (there is actually no real reason why warfare would not originate with the struggle for the basic essentials of the simple city), and Glauco agrees with what must seem to him a fact of life. What is not an obvious fact of life is that these soldiers would be a separate specialized class over and above the craftsmen and traders, but this follows from the principle of one profession for each professional already accepted by Adimantus during the creation of the simple city. Over the course of two books, however, the soldiers become the helpers of the guar-




dians; the latter are elite soldiers, but they are regarded as a third distinct class, being experts at ruling. Again, it is not an obvious fact of life that leaders should be permanent and professional, rather than, for example, elected for a fixed term of office, but it follows once again from the principle of one profession for each professional.

Glauco identifies first with the diners in the simple city, whose fare is too plain for him to stomach, then with the glorious soldiers fighting for their city, and finally with the leaders who dupe the soldiers with stratagems such as the Noble Lie and the mating lottery. His timocratic aspiration for glory, honor, and high office is being exploited by Socrates, and is exploited further in Books VI–VII.

So much for the way the transition comes about. Why Socrates needs a simple city before tackling the tripartite city is next to be considered. Socrates requires the tripartition of the city in order to facilitate the acceptance of complex souls, presented as tripartite. The unreal specialized classes, required in order to reflect the three specialized parts of the soul, would have been difficult to present had Socrates begun with a fully fledged tripartite aristocratic city. It is actually unlike any city known to his interlocutors, as Glauco will observe much later on,¹⁵ and they may have been resistant to it had it not been introduced gradually in the way that it was. Therefore, we may appreciate that the simple city is a device by which Socrates can introduce the principle of specialization, after which he can easily introduce two additional specialized classes.

I have already argued that the simple city, when regarded apart from other constitutions, is analogous to the simple soul; this is the disembodied good soul represented in Socrates the narrator, and its virtue is *phronêsis* (VII.518d9–e4), later deliberately confused by Socrates with *sophia* (p. 115). However, when the simple city is compared with the following tripartite city, many problems arise. Interestingly, Socrates appears to invite the comparison by declaring his preference for the simple city. He calls the classless city “true” or “real” (*alêthînê*—372e6) and “healthy” (*hygiês*—e7), while the subsequent city in its infancy he calls “spoilt” (*truphōsa*—e3) and “festering” (*phlegmainousa*—e8). Once the whole constitution is in place, and a mechanism has been devised for keeping further growth in check, Socrates can call the aristocratic city fine/beautiful (VII.572c2)¹⁶ and even good (VIII.543c9), and the aristocratic man is identified with the best man (544a6). This itself should give Glauco, the interlocutor at the beginning and the end of the construction of the aristocratic city, pause for thought. Which of the two cities, the simple or the aristocratic, is better, in Socrates’ view, and in his own?




A reassessment of the simple city in terms of the aristocratic city, were Glauco to have thought of doing it, would have caused him some confusion. On the one hand, the simple city comprises none but craftsmen and traders.



As if this were not bad enough for an upward-looking timocrat, the tripartite analogy strictly applied would indicate that the simple city lacks reason and emotion and is full of desire. On the other hand, the simple disembodied soul of Book VII, analogous to the simple city, has but *logos*, whose proper activity is prudence (*to phronein*), identified by Socrates with wisdom (*sophia*): according to Socrates' remarks in Book VII, it is only when the soul enters a body that there appear the other virtues, and, we may deduce, emotion and desire as well. By analogy, the simple city should consist only of rulers. Thus the simple city appears from the various accounts to be representative either of *logos* (and prudence/wisdom) only, or of desire only (which has no virtue specific to it, according to the arguments).

Some of the problems associated with the simple city are more apparent than real, and most may be ascribed to deliberate Socratic confusion. The simple city, for example, has been established prior to the elaborate analogies based on a tripartite structure. Although Socrates allows his interlocutors to assume the opposite, the artisans of the simple city are not the same as those of the tripartite constitutions where *logos* has been reallocated to the rulers and *thumos* to the soldiers. These artisans should be regarded as representing a combination of all three parts of the soul. Indeed, the notion of a city of good men, undifferentiated, has been anticipated in Book I (347d2).¹⁷

Moreover, Socrates' frequent identification of the simple city's virtue, prudence (*to phronein, phronêsis*), with one of the four virtues of the tripartite city, wisdom (*sophia*), lies at the root of many problems concerning the relationship between the differentiated virtues of the tripartite city and the one virtue (or undifferentiated virtues) of the simple city. As has already been remarked (e.g., p. 114), the dialogue is purportedly a search for justice, conducted by seeking, in cities and in individual souls, the four cardinal virtues of wisdom, bravery, temperance and justice, with justice being what is left after eliminating the other three. Even during this process, faulty as it already is, wisdom is often replaced by prudence in the list of virtues. This has the effect not only of identifying wisdom with prudence, but also of excluding prudence from courage and temperance. Socrates compounds the problem by elevating prudence at VII.518d9–e4 to the status of the only permanent faculty of the soul. He argues that “the other so-called virtues” (d9), having some connection with the body, would with habit and exercise be added to prudence when the soul is embodied. Having linked prudence with virtue, the same passage links prudence and wisdom with vice (519a1–6).¹⁸ It would necessarily follow that all souls are always prudent and wise, for good or ill. A further problem is that Socrates' identification of prudence with wisdom to the exclusion of the other three cardinal virtues leads to the conclusion that the simple city is prudent/wise, but not brave, temperate, or just. The description of the way of life in the simple city, however, suggests, at the very least, a degree of temperance and justice.




Socrates is very emphatic that prudence is the permanent faculty of the soul, whether in or out of a body. As disembodied, this soul has a simple constitution, and it would seem to follow by analogy that Socrates intends prudence to be regarded as the sole virtue¹⁹ of the simple city as well. If, in light of the problems just outlined, prudence and wisdom are not treated as identical, then it might seem at first sight that the simple prudent city lacks all other virtues, including wisdom. As just noted, however, the simple city Socrates describes seems to enjoy at least a degree of temperance and justice. A more satisfying solution is to accept that prudence and wisdom are indeed different, but not exclusively so. Wisdom and the other three cardinal virtues may be regarded as aspects of prudence.²⁰ During the setting up of the simple city, prudence is not mentioned, since Socrates wishes to concentrate on the tripartition of the city and the four cardinal virtues. He endeavours to facilitate what is effectively the analysis of prudence into its various aspects by adding specialized classes (auxiliaries and guardians) to the simple city (craftsmen) rather than by dissecting what is already in the simple city (i.e., prudence, into the four cardinal virtues). The timocrats are by this strategem tricked into accepting the tripartition of the soul without too much difficult reasoning.

It may now be seen that the healthy prudent simple soul is the aristocratic soul viewed in its entirety, without distinguishing its various aspects. Socrates the narrator and Socrates the narrated, it should come as no surprise, are essentially one and the same, viewed as simple and prudent or, through analysis, as complex and possessing the four cardinal virtues.²¹

It should be observed that Socrates' simple city is one model of a good city, while the aristocratic city presents a very different model of a good city. The simple and the aristocratic souls, however, unlike their city counterparts, are aspects of one and the same entity, the good soul. Furthermore, there is no simple city in this dialogue acting as the model of a bad city. The degenerate souls are not given analogous simple cities: there is no need for more than one simple city in this dialogue since it appears merely to facilitate the introduction of the tripartite city in all its permutations. Degenerate disembodied souls do appear in the account of simple souls, which is the Myth of Er, alongside the truly prudent Odysseus.

The two timocrats show no signs of confusion. They evidently do not make the comparisons between the various parts of the dialogue which would have been necessary for the confusions to occur. Socrates uses timocratic expectations and prejudices to lead them to a contemplation of the soul as tripartite, but in doing so, he distorts his analogy of the dramatic reality. In the next section we shall discover, finally, what motivates Socrates to do what he is doing in the dialogue.



DIALECTIC PRESENTED DIALECTICALLY


Perhaps the most well-known section of the whole dialogue is the Cave Analogy in which Socrates appears to describe his dialectical process. This analogy is actually the culmination of the apparent digression of Books V–VII, where we find the notorious three waves (women guards; the indiscriminate sharing of women and children; the philosopher-king) and what is widely regarded as the philosophical kernel of the dialogue, namely the Sun Analogy, the Divided Line Analogy, and the Cave Analogy, which deal with Being, Becoming, Reality, Appearance, and the Good, among other notions worth capitalizing. The analogies form a coherent unit, but their wider context, the digression, is also a coherent unit, as indeed is the dialogue as a whole.

As we have seen throughout the analysis so far, Socrates adapts his terminology and concepts to those of his interlocutors. This is clearly part of Socrates' dialectical method, yet in the Cave Analogy, which is essentially on the transition from opining to understanding achieved through dialectic, no mention is made of a dialectician adapting himself to the opinions of his interlocutors, even when the philosopher is portrayed attempting to release the prisoners from their bonds. Socrates omits this important aspect of the dialectic method precisely because dialectic requires him to use his interlocutors' mode of thinking, their interests, their expectations, and their terminology. His account of dialectic is therefore necessarily defective, both by omission and by perversion. The timocratic bias perverting the Cave Analogy may be better understood within the context of the digression as a whole.

The Three Waves

We have seen how the digression is caused by the intervention of the democratic Polemarchus and the downward-looking timocrat Adimantus (p. 149). Cleverly manipulated by Socrates, they demand further explanation regarding the common possession of women and children. The planned account of the degenerate cities and men is now postponed to Book VIII. Socrates in Books V–VI proceeds to negotiate three waves—seemingly insurmountable obstacles—which he overcomes by means of solutions calculated to appeal to the timocratic spirit.²²


Socrates prefaces the wave of the community of women and children with a smaller wave, that of women guards. By the time Socrates tackles the second wave, it has been made clear that the guards are not just men who happen to have wives in common, but that the guards are of both sexes; it then transpires that the guards of both sexes unwittingly participate in a breeding program organized by the rulers. Polemarchus is no doubt satisfied with the account Socrates provides since its novelty would appeal to his



democratic desires; but Socrates deals with these first two waves specifically by exploiting timocratic sentiments and interests.

Much earlier, still in Book III, Socrates considers at length the mixed education of the guards (by means of “music” and “gymnastics”), and then mentions a few activities which purportedly follow from their new principles. He suggests to Glauco that there is no need to go into too much detail over the particulars of this education. The dances, the hunts (“wild animals and dog-drives”), and the competitions, both “gymnastic” (i.e., naked, such as wrestling) and equestrian, all supposedly follow from the principles they have laid down (412b2–6). In fact, all the examples Socrates provides are traditional activities loved by timocrats because they foster competition. In Book IV, Socrates, again in conversation with Glauco, likens their search for justice to a hunt involving dogs (432b7–d4). Now, in Book V, at the very beginning of the discussion concerning the first wave, Socrates appeals to Glauco’s knowledge of dog breeding and training to secure Glauco’s agreement that women can and should be trained as guards. When prompted by Socrates, Glauco affirms that female dogs are not kept at home to rear young, but are trained together with the male dogs, although he does add that the females are weaker than the males. This is good enough for Socrates, since he can now suggest that in similar fashion, female human guards should be trained just like male human guards, in “music” and “gymnastics” (451d4–452a3). Glauco agrees that such things might appear ridiculous, and Socrates heightens the ridiculousness by pointing to the apparently logical conclusion that females of all ages should train naked alongside their male counterparts, since this is how the latter train (in gymnastics, at least). At this point, however, Socrates observes that for a man to be seen naked was not too long ago considered disgraceful and ridiculous by the Greeks in the way that it is now regarded by the barbarians; he adds, exploiting Glauco’s timocratic prejudice, that the first to train naked were the Cretans, and then the Spartans (452c9),²³ and this in turn allows him to comment that this no longer appears ridiculous because the excellence of the practice has been revealed in words (452d4–6).²⁴ Glauco is obliged and enabled to side with Socrates because the latter feeds his desire to appear socially and intellectually superior to the others.




Socrates could have ended the first wave here (women guards are not considered ridiculous by right-minded people such as Glauco), but he continues with a problem which Glauco should have brought up had he been thinking dialectically. Socrates uses a fictional objector to remind Glauco that the city was founded on the premise that each citizen would specialize in one thing. Since women and men specialize in different activities, it would seem to follow that if men are guards, women should not be (453b2–c6). Once again the dogs play their part in overcoming this objection. As Socrates observes, and Glauco agrees, most women are better at some activities than



most men, and vice versa, but specialization actually cuts across genders, as Glauco's experience with hunting dogs indicates. Therefore, just as some male and some female dogs make good hunting dogs, so some men and some women make good guards. The first wave, the problem of women guards, is thereby negotiated by 457c3. The final objection, merely delaying the conclusion, actually has a more important role in setting the scene for the second wave, since the sharing of women and children, the subject originally causing the digression, can now be discussed in terms intelligible to a timocratic dog breeder.

We have already had occasion to note that Socrates' aristocratic city removes those authority figures—the parents and poets—so resented by the timocrats, and replaces them with authority figures—the guardians—who are much more intrusive and deceitful than they ever were.²⁵ Glauco and Adimantus have been on the side of the lawmakers all along, being Socrates' accomplices, but now Glauco is given the opportunity to identify fully with the guardians in their role as breeders of guards. He agrees with Socrates that just as in the breeding of hunting dogs, so the specialist male and female guards will be paired by breeders (the guardians) and will not raise their own children. Unlike hunting dogs, however, some subterfuge is required on the part of the guardians in order to have the guards accept these policies. As noted in the earlier discussion (esp. p. 157), Socrates persuades the timocratic brothers that the deceptions are necessary for the good of the city, but he does emphasize that they are deceptions, and the brothers could (indeed, should) have objected at every step. Without realizing it, they adopt a degenerate version of the deception policy employed by their aristocratic authority figures (parents and poets) purportedly for the good of the city. Their motives, however, are tainted by the timocratic desire for reputation and high office.

Having dispensed with the second wave, the sharing of women and children,²⁶ by 471e5, Socrates turns to what he builds up as the third and biggest wave, the ridiculous notion of a ruler who philosophizes, or a philosopher who rules.²⁷ The philosopher-king becomes acceptable to the timocrat once he is portrayed as having the same relation to the city's guards as an expert dog breeder has with regard to hunting dogs. Just as the dog breeder must keep the good of the hunt in mind, so the philosopher-king must breed his guards with the good of the city in mind. By such a tortuous route, Socrates finally engages the timocrats in a discussion purportedly about philosophy and philosophical concerns. The timocrats are seduced by the notion that philosophy is the key to kingship or at least guardianship (this is especially true of the upward-looking timocrat, Glauco). Socrates, of course, is not seriously advocating philosophy as a means to kingship. It is purely another dialectical ploy designed to keep the attention of the timocrats long enough for their *logos* to win out over the *thumos*, and thereby replace their timocratic psychic constitution with an aristocratic one. Socrates, as usual, exploits



what interests his current interlocutors, and kingship is at the extreme of any timocratic desire for either reputation or for high office.

Socrates spends much of Book VI explaining to Adimantus why philosophers currently have no influence in the city although Socrates has claimed that the city's ills can be removed only when philosophers become the rulers. Adimantus' opening description of current philosophers (487c4–d5) reveals the extent to which Socrates must rehabilitate philosophers to make them attractive to the timocratic spirit.²⁸ Socrates distinguishes between the genuine philosopher and those imposters claiming to be philosophers, and emphasizes, for the benefit of a timocrat like Adimantus, the natural, moral, and social superiority of the genuine philosopher over the Many. After much softening up, Adimantus is happy to accept that philosophers in their natures would be the offspring of kings and potentates (502a4–7),²⁹ and that having philosophers rule the city would be difficult to achieve, but not impossible (c5–8). This soon leads to the successful conclusion to the third and biggest wave begun at 473c6, that the philosophers should rule, or that the kings should philosophize.

Socrates and his interlocutors appear to have successfully negotiated three waves, but in effect, Socrates has simply succeeded in establishing a spurious connection between philosophy and the timocratic interests of power and reputation. The three “waves” threatening to overwhelm them are now portrayed as merely ideas running counter to current opinion although in fact perfectly rational, just like dog breeding, and on a par with other practices once considered ridiculous but which are now accepted by all.³⁰ The new ideas thus become portrayed as ridiculous only to worthless people and the timocrats are obliged to agree with Socrates in order not to appear worthless themselves. Indeed, the timocrats have the added incentive of wishing to appear positively worthy of kingship.

The Longer Way

Now that the timocrats are open to the notion that philosophers should be the rulers, Socrates may expect them to pay at least some attention to what he claims such rulers should study. On the other hand, Socrates is well aware that they are still timocratic, and he continues to formulate his presentation accordingly. Even the conclusion to the third wave, that the rulers should be philosophers, is phrased with bravado and sophistic panache: “Let this have been dared to say, that guards in the strictest sense must be philosophers” (503b4–5).³¹ Then, having established that the people suitable for kingship are rare since they need to combine quick-wittedness with steadfastness, Socrates suggests that all others must partake “neither of education in the strictest sense nor of honor/position (*timê*) or office/rule (*archê*)” (d8–9);³² the outstandingly timocratic concerns of reputation and superiority are thus



firmly tied to this “most accurate” education—education in the strictest sense—which Socrates will soon apparently outline.

Immediately, Socrates allows Adimantus to show his apparent aptitude for this type of study; the timocrat appears to combine the two requisite characteristics of courage and mental prowess (503e1–504a8):³³

Testing should be made in the exertions and fears and pleasures which we were talking about then; but also, what we then passed over we now say, that it is necessary to exercise also in many studies, examining whether [the soul³⁴] will be able to bear the greatest studies or will play the coward, just like those playing the coward in the other [studies].




It is indeed fitting, he said, to examine thus. But what sort do you say are the greatest studies?

You no doubt remember, said I, that by distinguishing three aspects of soul, we inferred about justice and temperance and courage and wisdom what each was.

Were I not to remember, he said, I would not be fit to hear the rest.

Adimantus does not need to exert himself or strain his powers of memory to appear to the impressionable audience eligible for kingship: he has only to agree with the need for exertions, and to make an issue out of remembering the main thrust of the earlier conversation. Adimantus has no desire to be associated with cowards, and responds first to this. Socrates has, however, also planted the tempting notion of the greatest studies, to test just how steadfast Adimantus is. Adimantus cannot resist the bait, and having brusquely dissociated himself from cowards, immediately asks Socrates to tell him about these greatest studies. Instead of revealing the greatest studies immediately, Socrates allows Adimantus to appear to have a good memory by asking him whether he remembers what is in fact one of the salient features of the earlier discussion—the tripartite nature of the soul and the four cardinal virtues. Adimantus jumps at the opportunity to impress the audience with his prodigious memory (he could have just said “yes”). Socrates does not need to test whether Adimantus is thinking dialectically; he is a typically timocratic passive hearer, as he himself unwittingly emphasizes. Merely appearing to be steadfast and quick-witted will not lead to dialectical enlightenment.³⁵

Socrates proceeds to ask about a point he had made immediately prior to the discussion about the tripartite soul—something about a longer way—and suggests that the time has come to take it. Adimantus fails to compare what Socrates says now with what he said then, dialectically or otherwise; but if Socrates emphasizes the need to recall an earlier part of the discussion, it suggests he would have liked his interlocutor to have made a little more effort. What could Adimantus have noticed?



Prior to the discussion about the soul and its virtues in Book IV (with Glauco), Socrates observes that by analogy with the tripartite city, justice will be found in the soul of a man if it too is tripartite, and Glauco agrees with him that determining whether the soul actually is tripartite will be difficult (435a5c8). Socrates declares that in his opinion, this will not be determined accurately with the methods used previously to find justice in the city; “for there is a longer and more extensive way leading to this” (435d3).³⁶ However, Socrates immediately allows Glauco to be satisfied with the less strict account, and he indeed plays along with an account parallel to that of the tripartite city for the rest of Book IV.

It is only now in Book VI, having prepared Adimantus for the greatest studies (those required for kingship), that Socrates recalls what he said about a longer way, although it is now referred to as a longer way round, or a longer circuit (μακροτέρα . . . περίοδος 504b2, rather than simply ὁδός). Socrates brings it up by asking Adimantus whether he remembers what was said before the account of the tripartite soul (504b1–8):³⁷

We were saying somehow: that in order to perceive them [i.e., the virtues] as best as possible, there was another, longer, circuit; that they [i.e., the virtues] would be manifest to one who had gone round it; that nevertheless [i.e., instead of the longer way] it was possible to apply proofs/demonstrations following upon what had been said before [i.e., in the account of the tripartite city]. And you (pl.) said that it was sufficient, and thus the things at that time were told, so it seemed to me, lacking accuracy; but if [they seemed to have been told] satisfactorily to you (pl.), would you (pl.) say this?

They seemed to me at least, he said, [to be have been told] in good measure, and indeed to the others.

Adimantus here, like Glauco in the parallel passage, timocratically speaks on behalf of the others. As for his memory, Adimantus does not seem to notice the difference between a straight path leading to an answer elsewhere and a circuitous path which brings anyone who has travelled the length of it back to the beginning; nor does he recall that the original path was said to lead to an answer to the question whether the soul has three parts, a question prior to the search for justice in the soul; while here it is suggested that the longer way was to make all four virtues manifest.

When Socrates points out that a defective measure is no measure at all, Adimantus suddenly sides with him against those lazy people who are satisfied with less, although a moment ago he was as satisfied as they were with the earlier account. Socrates attempts to reinforce Adimantus’ apparent new zeal for effort by noting that this affect (laziness) is by no means befitting a guard of the city and its laws, and Adimantus, wishing to appear fitting, agrees. This allows Socrates to determine that such a person “must travel around the longer (way), and must make an effort no less in learning than in



exercising” (504c9–d1), apparently trapping Adimantus into traveling around a difficult and demanding circuit to discover the true nature of the four virtues. Immediately, however, Socrates provides Adimantus with an escape route (504d2–e6):³⁸

... or [else], what we were saying just now, he will never come to the goal of the greatest and most fitting study.

So, he said, aren't these things [i.e., the virtues] the greatest, but is there something greater than justice and the things we have recounted?



Both something greater, I said, and of these themselves it is necessary to see not an outline as now, but it is necessary not to pass over the most perfect finished-work. Isn't it ridiculous that [we] strive to do everything so that other things of little worth are as accurate and as clear as possible, but we do not think that the greatest accuracies are worthy of the greatest things?

Very much so, he said. But what you say is the greatest study, and about what it is, do you think, he said, anyone would let you off, not having asked you what it is?

Adimantus could have understood the goal of the greatest study to be the final manifestation of the virtues, as indeed they were saying just now. However, he seems to take the singular goal and the singular greatest study to refer to a single object of study—not four virtues, but something even greater than them. Socrates clearly foresaw this as a possibility, as he has a ready answer: there is indeed something greater; yet the four virtues are still a part of this greatest study. Adimantus, ever the timocrat, is attracted by the greater object, and at the same time places the burden of exposition back on Socrates.

Socrates accordingly goes on to reveal that this greatest subject is none other than something Adimantus has heard about on many previous occasions: the *idea* of the Good, that by which the various virtuous things become useful and beneficial (505a2–4).³⁹ He claims that the Many believe pleasure to be the Good, while cleverer people believe that it is actually prudence.⁴⁰ Both parties are speciously shown to be wrong (b8–d1): 1. taking the cleverer people first, prudence (i.e., understanding) of the Good is tautologous, since by substituting prudence for Good, this reads as prudence of prudence; the refutation plays on the widespread confusion between *phronêsis* and understanding (*epistêmê*); 2. some pleasures are bad, resulting in those advocating pleasure as the Good having to agree that good and bad are the same (this has the style of an eristic refutation). It should be noted that pleasures have good, bad, or neutral consequences, but pleasure itself is intrinsically good. Bad pleasures are intrinsically good with bad consequences, and Socrates' argument would fall were his interlocutors to query his eristic conclusion.

A little later, Socrates concludes that the constitution will be perfectly ordered if the guard overseeing it understands [the Good and its ramifica-




tions] (506a9–b1). Adimantus agrees that this is necessary, but rather than pursue this line of reasoning, he timocratically asks for Socrates' own view of the Good. Astonishingly, he asks Socrates whether he claims that the Good is *epistêmê* or pleasure, or something else (b2–4). Although Socrates has already refuted these two commonly held positions, he pretends to approve of Adimantus' unwillingness to be satisfied with what appears to others. Adimantus replies that it does not seem to him right for one who can say the opinions of others not to say his own opinion, although busying himself with these things for so long. He is of course speaking as a timocrat, and is not talking about himself but about Socrates. Socrates also refers to the opiner in the third person, anticipating some of the things he will address in the analogies concerning the difference between knowledge and opinion. Adimantus and the others, however, are allowed to infer that Socrates is attempting to get out of having to provide an account of the Good which he says they can obtain from others. This is the hook Socrates uses to reinvolve Glauco, the upward-looking timocrat, in the conversation, to be his interlocutor for all three analogies involving the Good. Glauco plays his part as the master of ceremonies by declaring that he and the others will be satisfied with an account of the Good just like the previous account of the virtues (506d1–5). Accuracy may not be high on the timocratic list of priorities, but a good story is.

The Sun Analogy⁴¹

Socrates has used the lure of kingship in order to engage Adimantus in a discussion connected with philosophy; he further entices the timocrat by referring to the subject as the greatest study, one which requires great fortitude and effort. When Socrates reveals that this subject is the Good, he intimates that the subject is beyond his powers. His apparent unwillingness to talk about the Good seems designed to draw Glauco back into the discussion. However, even when Glauco takes over from Adimantus, Socrates continues to be reticent. He tells Glauco that he will not give an account of the Good, but will discuss the Good's offspring, an offspring very similar to the Good. Socrates adds "If this is pleasing to you (pl.), but if not, then I'll let it go." Glauco the master of ceremonies and lover of stories responds as expected: "Indeed, tell. You'll pay up the account of the father another time" (506d8–e7).⁴² Socrates actually pays up almost immediately, since the offspring of the Good (the sun, in this case) is introduced precisely to serve as an analogy for the Good itself (508b12–13), about which Glauco and the others are then told some strange and wonderful things.

Socrates warns his audience before presenting the Sun Analogy to take care lest he deceives them, albeit unwillingly (507a4–5). Considering what we now know about Socrates' motives and devices, it would seem that Soc-






rates is encouraging his interlocutors to be active critics of the account, and not merely passive listeners; he is warning them that the account will deceive, if they are not careful. We too should be on our guard. Glauco's response does not bode well, as it is in the typically brusque timocratic style, impatient to get to the point that interests the timocrat: "We'll be as careful as possible. Just speak!" (a6).

In this first analogy, the sun will be in the physical realm what the Good is in the abstract realm. Socrates sets the analogy up by question and answer. The distinction between the physical and the abstract is quickly made at the beginning, all with the assent of Glauco: there are many fine and good things, but only one Fine itself and only one Good itself (and so on with other qualities); there is one *idea* of each type of things, which "we call" "what is" (b2–8). "We claim" that [the physical things] are seen and not intelligized [i.e., perceived by means of intelligence], while *ideai* are intelligized and not seen (b9–11). Glauco's assent confirms that these notions are not new to him.⁴³ The upward-looking timocrat need not understand them, but he can enjoy appearing to be knowledgeable.

Socrates concentrates, out of all the senses, on sight in order to introduce the sun as analogous to the Good. Seeing has already been introduced in opposition to intelligizing without any discussion of this choice of sense. Glauco not having noticed this himself, Socrates raises the matter and asks Glauco whether he has noticed that the maker of senses made the power of seeing and being seen the most extravagant/costly. Glauco, of course, has not noticed that. We may notice that for a timocrat, especially for Glauco whose extravagant tastes facilitated the transition from simple to complex city in Book II, costly items are a good thing, since other people are impressed by them. Socrates' argument, presented as usual in the form of questions which Glauco could have affected by his answers, is that vision is the only sense which requires something extra apart from the sense organ and the things sensed by it. Socrates first asks about hearing, but Glauco is unaware that air (or any other similar medium) is required in addition to the ears and sounds.⁴⁴ Had Glauco been aware, it would have been more difficult for Socrates to persuade him that vision is uniquely extravagant, but Socrates would surely have been happy to see signs of active thought in his interlocutor. As it is, they agree that only vision requires a third factor in addition to eyes and seeable things. This is of course light (e4–5).

It is then agreed that light is far from being unworthy/ignoble, and by this means Socrates causes Glauco to appreciate vision more than the other senses, because of the noble bond joining eyes to visible things (507e6–508a3). Socrates next turns to the source of the light. He refers to the god who has authority over the light, who makes our sight see as finely as possible, and who makes things seen be seen as finely as possible. From these hints, Glauco guesses correctly that Socrates is referring to the sun



(a4–8). Socrates thereby picks out one particular light source as superior to the many other light sources, and this will be the object analogous to the Good. He raises the value of this object by using the timocratic terminology of cost, political power and status. One effect of this timocratic bias is that good sight is attributed to sunlight bestowed by a god rather than to one's own attention to details, or indeed even to good eyes.

Socrates finishes off the physical side of his analogy by claiming that the eye is the most sunlike of the sense organs, and derives its power from the sun. The sun is the cause of sight, but is not sight itself, and the sun is seen by this sight (b3–11).⁴⁵


Socrates now reveals that the (timocratically honorable) sun is the offspring of the Good to which he had earlier referred.⁴⁶ Just as the sun in the visible realm (*topos*, “place”) is to sight and things seen, so the Good in the intelligible realm is to mind/intelligence (*nous*) and things intelligized (b12–c2). The reference to two distinct realms or places is clearly misleading,⁴⁷ but Socrates needs to use terminology which is intelligible to his interlocutor.

Instead of passing immediately to a description of the intelligible, Socrates asks a further point about the visible realm, now that he has established the sun as analogous to the Good. His question distinguishes between sunlight and nocturnal lights (be they the moon and the stars or any other light sources used at night), and draws attention to the relative blindness of the eyes at night. Glauco agrees that at night, the sight in the eyes is not clean/pure (c4–d3). We recall that the sun was the god having authority over the light which makes us see as finely as possible. These other lights make us see, but not so finely.⁴⁸ One assumption running throughout this passage is that seeing well or badly is something that happens to the viewer. Such passivity conforms with the timocratic worldview.⁴⁹

It is only now, with this distinction made between visible light and dark, that Socrates begins the comparison with the intelligible realm (508d4–9):⁵⁰

In this way, then, intelligize also the [organ] of the soul thus. Whenever it fixes itself upon something which truth/reality and what-is illuminate, it intelligizes and recognizes it and clearly has intelligence;⁵¹ but whenever [it fixes itself] upon that which is mixed with the dark, that which becomes and perishes, it opines and has weak sight, changing opinions up and down, and moreover is similar to something having no intelligence.

While concentrating on the difference between dimness and clarity, Socrates fails to name the organ of intelligence (*nous*), analogous to the organ of sight. Unlike the eye, the psychic organ is not specified, but is referred to as “the (neuter singular) of the soul,” and it is this, not the (feminine) soul, which governs the neuter participle “changing.” In this dialogue, the part of the soul





concerned with knowledge and opinion is the *logistikon*, but we should regard it as a capacity rather than as an organ of the soul (e.g., p. 159).

The timocratic passivity we have already observed in the account of the visible realm is also manifest from the very outset in this account of the intelligible realm. The agent knows or opines about an object insofar as the object being thought about is bathed in truth/reality or not. It is presented as an external variable over which the agent has little control. If the Sun Analogy is pressed, it could also be concluded that the same object may alternately be known and opined according to the changing external conditions of reality and darkness. It is while elaborating the *idea* of the Good, as that which provides both truth/reality to things being perceived and power to the perceiver, that Socrates stops asking questions for a while and tells Glauco what to say and think: “say!” (φάθι ε3); “be minded!” (διανοοῦ ε4); “thinking it, you will think rightly” (ἠγοούμενος αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς ἠγήση ε6); “right to believe . . . not right to think” (νομίζειν ὀρθόν, . . . ἠγεῖσθαι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχει 509a2, and again, a3–4); “it should be honored even more greatly” (ἀλλ’ ἔτι μαιζόνως τιμητέον a4–5). Glauco does not remark on being told what to think, but is impressed by the wonderful things he has been told to think. The timocrat should be impressed, since Socrates has told him that the Good is finer and is to be honored much more greatly than its products, namely knowledge/understanding (indiscriminately *epistēmē/gnōsis*) and truth/reality (*alêtheia*), themselves fine things (*kala*). Glauco remarks that the Good must surpass *epistēmē* and *alêtheia* in fineness, if it provides them, and observes that for Socrates, the Good is obviously not pleasure.⁵² Because he is a timocrat, it does not occur to him to express his own opinion on the matter.

Socrates now pulls out all the stops, and presses the Sun Analogy to the limit. He is still not asking Glauco questions and continues to make bald statements. He begins by asserting that just as the sun, in addition to sight, is also responsible for the coming-to-be (*genesis*), growth, and nourishment of things seen while not itself being this coming-to-be, so the Good is, in addition to perception, also responsible for the being/existence⁵³ of the things perceived, while not itself being this Being. Rather, the Good excels/exceeds/is-beyond Being (*ousia*) in seniority/dignity and in power (509b2–10). Glauco responds “very ridiculously” as might be expected of a timocrat with what appears to be a humorous address of thanks to the sun god: “Apollo of divine excess!” Glauco thereby effectively steals Socrates’ thunder and draws the audience’s attention back to himself. The joke also deflates the tension caused by the ever-increasing praise of the Good which finally had nowhere else to go, and it dramatically marks the end of the first analogy.


Socrates’ warning at the very beginning of the analogy about the possibility of deception should make us (if not Glauco) wary of the present argument (or string of far-fetched claims). The claim that the Good provides being to



things perceived while it is not Being itself is particularly problematic. The argument depends in part on the analogy with the sun. The opening claim appears to suggest that the sun, the source of coming-to-be in visible things,⁵⁴ does not itself come to be.⁵⁵ Rather than say that the sun does not (or has not) come to be, however, Socrates declares that it is not coming-to-be itself. This formulation allows the Good by analogy not to be Being itself, although (as Socrates claims) it provides perceived things with being. By this argument, the Good appears to control Being, and hence is portrayed as superior to it; this is the highest accolade the Good could receive in Socrates' attempt to commend it to Glauco.

The glorification of the Good at the expense of Being is as ontologically meaningless as would be the glorification of Being at the expense of the Good. Superiority and power are misapplied from timocratic ambitions to simple concepts, all in an attempt to endear the Good to Glauco. The Good has something to do with good things, as even Socrates pointed out at the beginning of the analogy (p. 185); Being has something to do with things that are.

When the confusions caused by the timocratic bias are taken into account, very little of philosophical substance remains, but it is of significance. The account, purportedly about something very like the Good, seems to have more to do with being and becoming, and knowing/understanding and opining. Things which are (and are therefore static) can be known, while things that come to be and pass away (and therefore are not static) can be opined. The formulation is problematic, again because of the timocratic bias. Knowing or opining is here made a by-product of the nature of the object, having nothing to do with the internal workings of the agent's mind, and this continues the theme, implicit throughout the analogy, of the passivity of the agent. Even allowing that only unchanging concepts can be known in the strict sense, it is not the case that simply because they are intelligible and unchanging they are automatically known by all and sundry. Throughout the analogy, for example, Glauco may have changed his opinions about the *idea* of Good a number of times, but he has not grasped its true nature. Even had Socrates told him explicitly what the Good was, Glauco would have become the proud possessor of an opinion, that of Socrates, rather than of knowledge and an understanding of the Good, which would require some effort and mental exercise on his part. In this respect, at least, Socrates is not doing a disservice to Glauco in merely glorifying the Good *ad absurdum*, since at least there might be a chance that the timocrat would then admire the Good albeit for the wrong reasons (conventional aristocratic manipulation). With all the obvious problems and contradictions raised, however, Socrates was surely attempting to puzzle and thereby arouse the timocrat's *logos* to take its rightful position or function in the soul (Socratic aristocratic beneficence).




The Divided Line Analogy⁵⁶

In response to Glauco's witty thanks to Apollo, Socrates says that on the contrary, Glauco is responsible,⁵⁷ since he is the one forcing him, Socrates, to say what seems to him about the Good. Socrates, of course, is only pretending that these opinions are his own; as we have seen, they are in fact a hotchpotch of timocratically inspired questions or claims which Glauco accepts without having examined them, and as such they represent the views neither of Socrates nor of Glauco. The account, however, may point towards something of more substance (as a shadow is indicative of the model which cast it), and the distinction between sensual and intelligible is particularly significant. This distinction is developed in the next two analogies, albeit with the usual timocratic bias which requires us to tread carefully.

Glauco not only does not mind being accused of forcing Socrates to voice his opinions about the Good, but now actually plays the part of the enforcer and commands Socrates not to leave out anything from his "likeness regarding the sun." Socrates whets his appetite by saying that he is leaving out a good deal, thus inducing Glauco to require him not to leave out even a small amount, to which Socrates acquiesces (509c5–11). Thus Glauco the timocrat is allowed to appear even more in control of the conversation than he has been so far, while he continues the timocratic tendency to listen to the opinions of others rather than think for himself. It is clear from Glauco's demand that he expects Socrates to continue comparing the Good with the sun. Socrates instead develops the theme of the visible and the intelligible, respectively identified with what comes to be and is opinable on the one hand, and what actually is and is knowable on the other; the sun itself reappears only in the subsequent Cave Analogy, where it is somewhat confusingly represented by a cave fire, while the Good is represented by the sun.

The Divided Line Analogy is intended to represent varying degrees of epistemic clarity. There are two metaphors at play: a development of the visible and intelligible realms, and an imaginary line whose sections of varying length represent the varying degrees of epistemic clarity. The whole analogy may be summarized and conflated as follows. Of the imaginary line, the two shorter sections represent the visible realm, and the two longer sections represent the intelligible realm. The shortest section of the line corresponds with shadows or reflections of visible objects and represents *eikasia* ("likening"); next is a longer section corresponding with visible objects, and this represents *pistis* ("conviction"); the next section, already in the intelligible realm, corresponds with visible images used in the service of activities such as geometry, and this represents *dianoia* ("intending," where objects are understood to represent abstracts); the longest section corresponds with the *eidē* (interestingly not the *ideai*) themselves, and this represents *noēsis* ("intelligizing").



It is only in the latter section, intelligizing, that dialectic (the power or knowledge of conversing) is said to take place: (Socrates) “Understand that I am saying the other section of the intelligible is this which the *logos* itself touches by the power of conversing” (511b3–4);⁵⁸ (Glauco).” . . . you wish to determine that what is contemplated of Being and the intelligible by the knowledge of conversing is clearer than what [is contemplated of Being and the intelligible] by the so-called *technai*” (c4–6).⁵⁹ Socrates is setting up dialectic as the mode of higher education which the rare candidate is required to undergo in order to become a philosopher-king. In order to attract the timocrat to dialectic, Socrates is obliged to pervert the presentation of the character of dialectic, for it is not the case that dialectic is restricted to the passive contemplation of aspects (*eidê*) at the highest epistemic level. At the very least, it includes the careful examination of opinions on the way to an understanding of truth/reality. We may note that Socrates at the very beginning of the analogy tells Glauco, misleadingly, to intelligize what he tells him (509d1), but he goes on to present a (somewhat inaccurate) state of affairs instead of asking Glauco questions dialectically. This continues the procedure of presentation adopted towards the end of the last analogy, and conforms with the passivity of Glauco.

In marked contrast to his apparent spoonfeeding of a passive timocrat, Socrates emphasizes mental activity at the end of the analogy when he identifies the longest section of the line with *noêsis* (“intelligizing”) and the shortest with *eikasia* (“likening;” “forming a likeness”). He adopts Glauco’s contribution *dianoia* (in this context, “intention”) for the epistemological state at the level of geometry. The word *dianoia* probably recalls Socrates’ own use of the participle *δυνασόμενοι* in the same context slightly earlier (510d6), where he observes that geometers use visible objects, but “intend” by them intelligible objects. Glauco positions *dianoia* between *nous* and *doxa* (511d2–5). In the Sun Analogy, *nous* was analogous to sight (508b12–c2, p. 186), and was the general activity of intelligizing in the intelligible realm. Were we to apply it here, *nous* would be the general activity comprising *noêsis* and *dianoia*. Glauco’s *doxa*, making its first appearance in the analogies, might be similarly applied as the general activity comprising *pistis* and *eikasia*. The mental activity represented by each part of the line is also represented by the associated objects of perception, something we have already observed to be problematic in the previous analogy. One of the clearest examples of this problem may be seen in the case of aspects (*eidê*): they are not intelligized but opined by Glauco, although they purportedly represent things intelligized.



The various ratios supplied by Socrates for the sections of the line lead to the conclusion, not made explicit in the discussion, that the two central sections (visible things *per se* and visible things in the service of thinking) are of the same length.⁶⁰ It would follow that “conviction” and “intention”



have the same epistemic clarity, since epistemic clarity is what the lengths are said to represent. If, however, the geometer, for example, uses a visible circle to represent an intelligized geometrical abstract circle (as Socrates indicates that he does), his “intended” circle must have more epistemic clarity than the merely visible circle. If so, the section representing “intention” should be longer than that representing “conviction.” They should be equal only to the extent that the visible (or more generally, sensed) object is the same in both cases. We may conclude that the lengths of the four sections actually represent not epistemic clarity, but more concretely the type of object being perceived, namely: guessed object; sensed object; sensed object; intelligible object. Furthermore, the sensed object is in some way a result of the intelligible, just as the reflections are in some way a result of the sensed object. Therefore, the sensed object may be looked at in three ways. It may be: guessed at through its reflections; deduced from the intelligible; or sensed directly with the sense organs. We shall return to this subject after a survey of the Cave Analogy.

The Cave Analogy⁶¹

The Cave Analogy is possibly the most well-known passage in the Platonic corpus, and is certainly often presented as such. The arresting notion that our reality is no more than a series of shadows of models of what is actually real has generated more than its fair share of echoes to fill the cave. The analogy seems to be a simple one. Cave dwellers are bound in such a way that they can only look ahead at a wall onto which shadows of models of natural objects are projected by a fire situated behind the captives and on a higher level. The conveyors of the models are often interpreted by those who consider the dialogue to be a political manifesto as politicians who impose upon ordinary citizens their own opinions. Since the cave dwellers have been exposed only to these shadows their whole life, they assume that these shadows are real objects. If, however, one is released and manages to turn his head, he perceives both the models and the fire. Now free of his bonds, he can proceed up a path which exits into the world above ground where, at first, he sees in puddles only the reflections of natural objects such as trees, and then looks up to see the objects themselves, and finally the sun itself, the source of light by which the natural objects are seen. Now aware that this is the reality of which all his life he has seen only shadows of models, he returns to the cave to release his fellow captives, but this turns out to be something of a challenge since he appears to the cave dwellers to be quite mad, and he is in danger of being killed by them. This is an obvious allusion to the historical Socrates who was (arguably) killed for attempting to release his fellow citizens from their delusions.



We, however, should recall that the narrated Socrates is presenting this analogy to an audience, and particularly to Glauco his respondent. If the analogy has any basis at all, we may apply it to the present scene, just as we applied the accounts of various souls to the various characters in the dialogue. The very fact that the narrator Socrates begins the whole dialogue by describing himself going down with Glauco (albeit to Piraeus) suggests that Plato intended the reader to make the connection. Glauco, then, is looking at shadows on a wall, and listening to echoes. The shadows and echoes are currently being projected by none other than Socrates. The timocratic bias we have seen throughout Books V and VI continues here, and the first element to notice is the usual passivity of the timocrat, who loves to watch and to listen and to have his thoughts formed for him. The captive's bonds are the captive's own inertia; he is used to watching shadows, and listening to echoes. His opinions are provided by various manipulators because he is unused to thinking original thoughts for himself. The current manipulator, as already observed, is Socrates, but we have also had occasion to see that Glauco in the past of this drama has suffered other manipulators in the form of more conventional aristocrats (parents and poets) and at least one tyrant (Thrasymachus).

Let us remain for the time being with Socrates. The Cave Analogy dramatizes Socrates' communication with the timocrat, and helps to explain the aristocrat's apparent penchant for lying and deceiving. Since the timocrat takes note only of shadows and echoes, Socrates must use shadows and echoes in his attempt to engage him. Glauco for his part is timocratically enjoying listening to the account provided by Socrates, and he dutifully reacts whenever necessary in order to appear superior to the others, just like one of the clever shadow watchers whom Socrates describes as praised and honored by his fellow captives (516c8–9), a point emphasizing once again the timocratic bias. The Cave Analogy tells how the escaped cave dweller returns to release his fellow captives, only to meet with hostility. Socrates, however, is in no danger of being killed by an angry Glauco. If Socrates is playing the rescuer, he is not following his own analogy. In fact, it is not Socrates on the raised path who can release Glauco from his bonds, but Glauco himself, and Glauco is an intellectually passive timocrat.

The Cave Analogy is intended to show in what condition "our" nature is regarding education and the lack of it. This, at least, is what Socrates asks Glauco to make a likeness of, at the beginning of Book VII.⁶² Making a likeness is at the lowest level of perception according to the Divided Line Analogy, as if the Cave Analogy were simply a guess or a conjecture. It is interesting that Socrates had ordered Glauco to intelligize the Divided Line Analogy (509d1). Intelligizing is at the highest level of perception, as if the divided line were a constant abstract entity.

A brief comparison of the epistemological states represented in the Cave Analogy with those of the previous analogies indicates a basically similar structure, although with modifications. The problematic external representation of states of mind as categories of things perceived is carried over from the earlier analogies. The visible realm of the Sun and the Divided Line analogies is now represented by the cave, while the sun associated with that visible realm is represented by the cave fire; the intelligible realm is represented by an extension of the visible world outside the cave, and the Good is consequently represented by the sun. The subdivision of the two realms, introduced in the Divided Line Analogy, is maintained, *mutatis mutandis*. Of the former visible realm, the shadows are still shadows; but now they are cast not by natural visible objects, but by models of them; instead of the subdivision into geometrical constructs and the *eidê/ideai* themselves, the intelligible realm is represented by reflections of the natural visible objects and the natural visible objects themselves. The epistemological states represented by these various objects (533e7–534a5) have changed only slightly from the previous analogy (p. 189 above): as before, opinion (*doxa*) is subdivided into “likening” (*eikasia*) and “conviction” (*pistis*) with regard to “coming-to-be” (*genesis*); but instead of our inference that it is mind (*nous*) which is subdivided into “intention” (*dianoia*) and “intelligizing” (*noêsis*), “intelligizing” (*noêsis*) itself is subdivided into “intention” (*dianoia*) and “knowledge”/“understanding” (*epistêmê*) with regard to Being (*ousia*).

The representation of the two vastly different realms in one geographically coherent visible world seems designed to facilitate the portrayal of the major innovation in this analogy—movement from one realm to the other. This movement purportedly pertains to the sort of education leading to a change in one’s epistemological grasp of reality. In the subsequent discussion of the Cave Analogy, the journey from the cave up to the sunlight is agreed by Socrates and Glauco to be dialectic (532b4–8); the discussion then turns to the nature of dialectic and how to acquire it. We might do well to begin with this and then see how successfully the account of dialectic fits with the journey described in the Cave Analogy.

Dialectic is presented both as the keystone of all studies, and as the end of all studies (534e2–535a1). This would mean that all other studies are conducted unthinkingly on the way to dialectic. We may suspect that the superiority of dialectic is emphasized in order to attract the timocrat to it. Be that as it may, gymnastics and “music” are still to be taught as basic education, but those being groomed for the position of philosopher-king will undergo further studies in preparation for dialectic. These are the studies pertaining to number: arithmetic, geometry, solid geometry, astronomy (one- to four-dimensional studies respectively), and harmonics, all touched upon in 525a9–531c7, and summarized as the pre-education required before dialectic at 536d5–8. Arithmetic, when studied properly, is a necessary study, since it

appears to force the soul to use “intelligizing” (*noêsis*) in the direction of truth/reality itself (526a8–b4), and the same could be said about the other studies as well. This is all well and good, but arithmetic and the rest are not always studied to this end, as indeed is emphasized, firstly by Socrates. Arithmetic is often learned only for trade and such worldly matters (525c3–4); geometry is practiced with regard to coming-to-be (*genesis*) and not with regard to Being (*ousia*) (526e6–527a4); solid geometry is not even a recognized subject (528b4–5); astronomy, suggests Glauco, is useful in agriculture, navigation, and warfare, to which Socrates replies that Glauco fears the Many and does not wish to appear to ordain useless studies (527d2–6), and astronomy is often studied with the eyes rather than with *noêsis* (529b2); finally, the Pythagoreans (530d8) study harmony in a similar way, preferring, as Glauco wittily puts it, ears to *nous* (530e7–531b1).


Socrates may insist at every step that they should lay down laws to teach these fields of study in such a way that the mind is provoked to think about *ousia*, but it is a fact that these studies do not inherently provoke the mind to rise above ephemeral matters. If these studies are to be taught in the way Socrates envisages, they require an additional element which would provoke the mind to think about *ousia*. It follows that, despite the inordinate amount of space devoted to these fields of study, they are no more or less important than other fields of study treated in a way that provokes thought about *ousia*.

Socrates himself provides an example of mental provocation, and he chooses to provide it at the beginning of his discussion of number, although it has nothing to do with number. Firstly, Socrates expresses his opinion about the nature of arithmetic (523a1–3):⁶³

[Arithmetic] happens to be by nature one of the [studies] leading to *noêsis* which we are looking for; but no one uses it correctly, being something that can draw [one] entirely towards *ousia*.

As we recently observed, a little later in their discussion at 526a8–b4, arithmetic is said to force the soul to use *noêsis* in the direction of truth/reality. Yet it is clear from what Socrates says here that arithmetic *per se* does not force the soul towards intelligizing (i.e., towards perceiving Being), since it can be used incorrectly. Socrates now has to enter a small digression to explain to Glauco what he regards as thought-provoking, and what not. He asks Glauco to confirm or deny what he says as they go along, in order to clarify the matter, but this is surely not the way to produce clarity.


Socrates claims that things which are sufficiently judged by the senses do not provoke thought, while things that the sense cannot validate do provoke thought. Dialectic is induced by provocation. He uses the example of three fingers of one hand (those farthest away from the thumb), one long, one medium, and one short. The middle finger of these three, *qua* finger, is



unremarkable, and the senses satisfy the judgement that it is a finger; but as being longer than the short finger while shorter than the long finger (and similarly with other relevant attributes such as soft/hard, smooth/rough and heavy/light), it appears to be two opposite things, and for this reason, the soul calls upon *logismos* and *noêsis* to differentiate and resolve the problem. Glauco agrees (523b11–524c9). Much of the formulation here is, as usual, problematic: for example, that sight could see great and small, not separately but fused together (524c3),⁶⁴ as opposed to *noêsis* which would see them separately; and note that *noêsis* would be forced to do this (c6–7).⁶⁵ More important is the claim that three different objects all being called “finger” would not provoke thought; here Socrates concentrates on the one finger, but there are three, and a comparison of all three would (ideally) have led by induction to the notion of fingerhood. Conversely, the claim that something possessing two opposing attributes would provoke the search for the Attributes Themselves is clearly not reflected in the behavior of Glauco, although the problem is presented to his face.

The example of the three fingers, in keeping with the self-reflexive nature of the dialogue as a whole, is itself an example of provocation, and should not be taken at face value. According to Socrates, provocation occurs only when the senses fail to make a judgement, and the *logos* (or *noêsis*) is forced to come to the rescue. Puzzlement, however, should also occur when, for example, cherished opinions or deep-seated assumptions conflict. The realm of opinion is precisely where the mind needs to be provoked to impel it towards intelligizing. Since most people are in the realm of opinion most of the time, it would seem to follow that the Many would constantly be provoked into thought and impelled towards intelligizing. This does not often happen, because a conflict between opinions needs to be noticed or bothered about, which is rarely the case. Usually, conflicting opinions or assumptions are compartmentalized. It is only when two (or more) conflicting opinions or assumptions are raised and considered at the same time that a discrepancy has any chance of being noticed. Socrates is the facilitator of such discrepancies.

Let us return for a moment to the conveyors of models in the cave. The passive timocrat staring at the shadows is as one spoonfed opinions, and he reacts in ways designed to make himself appear good to his fellow captives spoonfed the same opinions. The analogy is about epistemological states and influences and it is consequently unable to portray actual physical behavior beyond having the timocrat admired for guessing the correct order of the shadows and for performing other appropriate vocal reactions. Taking this necessary shortcoming into account, we might distinguish between the various opinion formers as follows: the conventional psychic aristocrats (the timocrat’s parents, and poets) would project those shadows and voice those sentiments which would ensure that the timocrat, although remaining a timo-



crat, behaved well. The tyrant, such as Thrasymachus, causes the timocrat to become disaffected with the shadows and echoes cast by the conventional aristocrats, but not in a way that would turn the timocrat towards the light; the tyrant merely attracts the timocrat to his own tyrannical set of shadows and echoes; the timocrat does not behave differently in public, but the new shadows fascinate him, and they play on his sense of thwarted superiority. Socrates is an unconventional psychic aristocrat: he too projects shadows in the same way as the conventional aristocrats in order to make the timocrat behave better while remaining a timocrat by allowing the timocrat to feel superior to everyone else; this conventional subterfuge, however, is the vehicle by which he goes a step further, by generating discrepancies in an attempt to provoke puzzlement and thereby release the timocrat from his inertia and draw his attention away from the shadows on the wall, away from the opinions of others. Socrates wishes to turn the timocrat into an aristocrat, which would happen when the timocrat's *logos* finally takes charge and seeks reality/truth; failing that, of course, he can hope that the timocrat will at least behave well for the wrong reasons.

Thus conventional aristocrats, tyrants, and currently Socrates, a new type of aristocrat, vie for the timocrat's attention with their shadows and echoes, all playing upon the timocrat's need to appear the best. It is for this reason that even in the very presentation of dialectic in the Cave Analogy and the subsequent discussion concerning dialectic Socrates emphasizes time and again how superior dialectic is, how superior the object of dialectic is, and of course, how superior the dialectician is. On this level, Socrates ensures Glauco's interest, albeit for the wrong reasons, in dialectic. Woven into this timocratically biased presentation are many discrepancies, designed to puzzle the timocratic soul and ultimately turn it towards the light and psychic health. Here are a few examples to illustrate the timocratic bias and Socrates' attempt to provoke thought.

The timocrat in his imagined superiority is intellectually lazy and passive, having others provide him with opinions. When Socrates asks Glauco to make a (mental) likeness of the cave, the timocrat says that he sees what Socrates describes—the captives staring at a cave wall, a raised walled path behind them, and a fire at a higher level behind that (514a1–b7). Socrates then tells Glauco to see people walking along the raised path, raising images above the wall and making sounds appropriate to the images as in a puppet show (514b8–515a3). We might have expected Glauco to react to the puppeteers, but he is more interested in the captives (a4):⁶⁶

You relate an absurd⁶⁷ image and absurd captives.

Socrates accordingly drops the puppeteers for a moment and concentrates on the captives (a5–b1):⁶⁸





[They are] like us, I said. For do you think, first of all, that such people see anything of themselves and each other apart from the shadows [cast] by the fire falling onto the [side] of the cave opposite them?

[No], he said, for how could they if they are compelled by force to hold their heads unmoving?

Here is what Glauco should have pictured to himself. The fire which is above and behind the raised walled path behind the captives will not project their shadows onto the wall opposite them, but onto the floor in front of them. The application of geometry would have made this point obvious.⁶⁹ Socrates does not point this discrepancy out, but now adds another element which would seem to obliterate the captives' shadows altogether. He points out that the shadows cast by the models (carried by people behind the path wall) would also fall upon the cave wall opposite (b2). He does not mention the wall of the raised path, but its shadow could be conceived as reaching all the way to at least the foot of the opposite wall upon which the shadows of the models appear. Were Glauco to have been picturing clearly, he would have noticed these discrepancies, but he does not. Thus he is not even imagining as Socrates requested. His *logos* is not called in to help sort out the problem, because he sees no problem.


Socrates develops the notion of compulsion and effort. The cave dwellers are originally bound, apparently against their will, but their release is portrayed as a worse form of compulsion since it involves pain; someone is released (he does not release himself) and is forced to stand up, turn his neck, and walk towards the cave fire, and suffers pain through all these actions (515c4–8). He is compelled to do many things by an unnamed companion, and he continues to suffer from looking at the fire (e2), from being dragged by force (e6) along the rough uphill path to the cave's exit, emphatically being dragged in great pain (515e8–516a3), and at the exit he will be blinded by the sunlight. This may be contrasted with an observation Socrates makes a little later, that while the body suffers in exercise, the “free man” (a citizen such as Glauco) should not learn any study “with slavery,” and Glauco agrees (536e1–5). Socrates immediately goes on to tell Glauco to raise the city's children in studies not with force but in play, so that Glauco might better perceive the natural bent of each child, and Glauco declares that there is reason in what Socrates says. Glauco fails to see any discrepancy (real or apparent) between the compulsory nature both of the captivity in the cave and of the release and ascent from the cave, and the lax attitude towards education that Socrates later proposes for free men. Among other reasons, Glauco is by then basking in his role as the designated overseer of the education program, and has distanced himself (wittingly or unwittingly) from Socrates' original observation that the captives are “like us.”



Compulsion extends not only to the captives and to those who are released and forced to ascend, but also to those who have been lucky enough to gaze upon the sun. Instead of being allowed to stay above ground, they will be forced to descend back into the cave in order to look after and to guard the other captives (520a8–9). As we shall soon see, this appears to come as something of a shock to Glauco, and understandably so. He is of course already averse to the life of the captive, especially after it is pointed out to him that the freed man is happy and would pity the remaining captives, and that the honors and praises to be gained in the cave are empty (516c4–e2). Interestingly, Socrates has also emphasized the apparent fact (based on the usual timocratic perception of philosophers) that anyone returning to the cave after being in the sunlight would be blinded by the darkness and would accordingly be a laughingstock (516e3–517a2). Thus life in the cave is most emphatically dishonorable. Now here is Socrates claiming that it is “our task” to force the best natures to the greatest study, to see the Good, and to make the ascent, although not to allow them to stay above ground, but to descend once more into the cave and share the captives’ toils and honors, whether the honors are more or less unworthy or serious (519c8–d7).⁷⁰ Glauco is offended on behalf of these best natures compelled to go back down: “Then we shall do them injustice, and make them live worse when they could live better” (d8-9).⁷¹

While Glauco seems to be aware that living a real life is preferable to the derivative life in the cave even with all its honors, his preference for the life outside the cave is actually based on the timocratic sense of superiority, success, freedom and covert pleasure. He has none of the pity for the cave dwellers that Socrates mentioned at 516c6, and Socrates needs to remind Glauco that the law is not concerned with the outstanding success of one class in the city, but with the good of the city as a whole, to which end persuasion and force are applied to every class (519e1–520a5). Socrates now spends some time explaining how it is actually just to force a philosopher of the sort they have educated to rule, making as he does so disparaging remarks about the usual sort of politically useless philosophers, and Glauco is happy to acknowledge that “we will impose just things upon just people” (a6–e2). He is laying down the law for budding philosopher-kings, themselves superior to ordinary philosophers and to ordinary rulers alike. Glauco would be the first of the philosopher-kings, unwillingly of course: the notion of being forced to rule appeals to the timocratic sensibility of not appearing to want power or wealth. As lawmaker, however, it seems that he regards himself as superior even to the philosopher-kings, and exempt from the obligations he imposes on others.

The distinction between philosopher-kings and ordinary rulers allows Socrates, with Glauco’s assent, to depict the life of true philosophy to be the only life that scorns or looks down upon political posts (521b1–2). Further-




more, people who desire to rule should not rule, because there will rise up rival desirers of rule (b4–6). This is of course an illogical claim since desirers of rule can always rise up and fight rulers whether the latter are desirous of rule or not. Be that as it may, if the people suitable to rule despise political power, and if the people desirous of political power are barred from ruling, then it follows that the people suitable to rule should be forced to rule (b7–11):⁷²

Whom else will you force to go to the guarding of the city other than the most prudent about the things through which a city is governed best, and [who currently] have other honors/positions and a life better than the political?

No one else, he said.

This, of course, is the only answer Glauco could have given, without actually beginning to rebel against his timocratic instincts. There are two possible reasons for his acceptance of this enforced stay in the cave. One is that he may have convinced himself that he, the lawgiver, while forcing others to descend, is himself exempt (Socrates' shadows having beguiled him utterly). If, on the other hand, he is still identifying to some extent with the people worthy of becoming philosopher-kings, he cannot lose face with the audience who he presumes now admire philosopher-kings, and he must go along with what Socrates says (unwittingly playing the part of the clever cave dweller being praised by his fellows).

Socrates has set up several discrepancies designed to perplex a timocrat. The timocrat does not question the fact that a ruler is superior to those ruled.⁷³ For this reason he wishes to rule. However, Socrates has now emphasized that the philosopher-king must participate in the toils and (worthless) honors of politics in the cave, having given up the superior honors or positions of philosophical life above ground (whatever they may be). The life of the ruler is portrayed as less worthy, from the timocratic point of view. Socrates repeatedly claims that the ones who have seen the sunlight should descend to guard and care for the cave dwellers (519c8–d7; 520a8–9, and now 521b7). Had Glauco been thinking of dialectic (the point of the analogy) rather than, or as well as, ruling, he might have realized that there is a way out of being forced to participate in the toil and honors of the cave. All he would need to do is enact a law requiring people⁷⁴ to go down into the cave not in order to guard and care for the captives there, but to release the captives, and force them to ascend (cf. 515c4–8). However, releasing the captives does not occur to him at all. He is stuck on the idea provided by Socrates that the philosopher-king guards and cares for the ruled. Furthermore, were everyone to be released and forced to ascend to the sunlight, Glauco would no longer (in his mind) be superior.⁷⁵




REMOVING THE TIMOCRATIC BIAS

The digression of Books V-VII is itself an exercise in dialectic during an attempt to cause the timocrats, but primarily the upward-looking timocrat, Glauco, to embrace dialectic and goodness. Glauco's expectations and aspirations⁷⁶ are generously fed in order to make the discrepancies scattered throughout the digression all the more jarring were the timocrat to think about them. That he does not think about them is not a Platonic criticism of the Socratic method, but a necessary outcome in a philosophical drama where the characters must be extreme and consistent stereotypes in order to serve as philosophically significant models.

The subjects discussed in Socrates' attempt to arouse dialectical puzzlement are not to be taken at face value. The digression's three waves and three analogies see the construction of the philosopher-king, the gradual ascent of Glauco to the role of philosopher-king, and the gradual unfolding of that education apparently required by the philosopher-king. All these topics engage the interest of the timocrat and serve as the vehicle for discrepancies which might (but do not) cause him to begin to think about reality rather than reputation. In this respect, the digression is no different from the rest of the dialogue which is entirely designed to engage the attention of the interlocutors long enough to allow numerous discrepancies the opportunity to cause puzzlement.



Although in the first two waves Socrates plays up the subject of the sharing of women in reaction to the interest shown by the other participants in the discussion, gender is not an issue with respect to the tripartition of the soul, where women are no different from men.⁷⁷ Socrates exploits the issue to establish a similarity between dog breeding and guard breeding, and this is no more than an artifice designed to raise Glauco above the level of the soldier class. The deceptions Socrates introduces during the breeding programme address timocratic resentment, fanned by tyrannical sedition (Thrasymachus), against aristocratic authority figures (parents and poets). Socrates would have liked Glauco to ponder the fact that the new regime is far more deceptive and intrusive than the real one in which Glauco and Adimantus live. The subject of deception returns in the discussion of the Changeling (p. 157), which itself should have caused Glauco to realize that the shadows on the wall in the Cave Analogy are cast by deceivers.⁷⁸ It would have been a step in the right direction had he realized that Socrates is one of these deceivers (indeed, Socrates often prefaces new topics with the warning that he is talking about things he does not know⁷⁹), but Glauco, being a timocrat, is habituated to consuming uncritically the opinions of others.

The notion of a philosopher-king is an incentive Socrates throws to the timocrats to encourage them to pay a little more respect than usual to philosophy. Socrates reflects back to them the very low opinion they have of



philosophy, seen for example in the description of the mocked and socially inept philosopher in Book VI. Instead of explaining why appearances should not deceive, Socrates accepts that the best (current) philosophers are useless (e.g. 489b3–5) and give philosophy a bad name (c9–d6). By degrees, Socrates develops the impression that when philosophy is conducted usefully (i.e., for political ends) by excellent people (especially by Glauco, of course), its exponents are worthy to be rulers, and the laws in their aristocratic city will actually require such people to rule. This purportedly useful philosophy is a distortion of philosophy made in the image of the timocrat.⁸⁰ It is also hardly useful. The ultimate step in this new philosophy is to gaze at the sun (i.e., the Good: 516b4). Socrates suggests that Glauco would not be surprised that those who have gone above ground would not want to engage in human affairs, but rather, their souls are always pressing to spend their time up there (517c7–9). Socrates adds the proviso that this would seem likely if indeed it is like this according to the analogy, and Glauco, rather than reconsider the analogy, immediately agrees that this is likely (d1–3). In this way Socrates builds up the glory and honor of the Good, as something worth gazing at, indeed, the thing most worth gazing at. Yet by preferring this act to actually doing anything beneficial in human affairs, the gazer betrays his own lack of worth to society. For the timocrat, the Good is much like anything else he is confronted with, the apparent knowledge of which will increase his status among the cave dwellers. We may recall that this Good is, as it were, a shadow projected by Socrates in the cave. It has been a vehicle, like everything else, upon which Socrates can load up discrepancies. If all else fails, however, Glauco may remain with a feeling that the Good is a good thing.⁸¹

The Cave Analogy can be recommended to budding dialecticians only because it exemplifies the dialectic method in its presentation. To appreciate and fully explain the imagery and the discrepancies, however, it must be understood that a psychic aristocrat is presenting the analogy to a psychic timocrat. Socratic dialectic is adapted by the questioner to the needs of the character of the one questioned. The Cave Analogy, for example, is passive, with the rescued captive merely receiving opinions or knowledge (through eyes or mind), and being forced by someone else to move from one level to another. This is how a timocrat functions at the epistemic level. The presentation of dialectic, then, has not spoonfed us with Plato's educational programme, but we should not be disappointed. The many discrepancies we have discovered throughout the dialogue are an indication that the dialogue as a whole is a dialectic exercise leading to some sort of upper world. The next chapter will therefore attempt to identify the reality behind the philosophical drama of the *Politeia*.



NOTES

1. To anticipate, the accounts act as shadows cast by the participants acting as models held up by Socrates the narrator; one's gaze must be turned from the shadows to the models as a first step towards dialectic enlightenment.

2. The effect of these pervasive timocratic elements when they are not recognized as such have almost inevitably led to appraisals such as the following by Flew (1995) 436: "The arguments which Socrates deploys against Thrasymachus duly silence him, but do not, or at any rate should not, satisfy anyone. Immediately at the beginning of Book II Glaucon distinguishes three kinds of good. . . . The remainder of *The Republic* is presented as an attempt by Socrates—here presumably no more than Plato's mouthpiece—to meet Glaucon's challenge to show that their justice is indeed always advantageous to the just themselves and not exclusively to others. In response, Plato unfolds his design for a city ruled by an élite order of Guardians; the notorious philosopher-kings whose knowledge of the Ideal Forms—the abstract essences of things—enables them to prescribe to the uninitiated vulgar the true, eternal and authoritative standards. And it is through this vision of a Dorian city stately as a Dorian temple that Plato expounds his own answer to what is the official master question of the entire dialogue, namely, 'What is justice?'"

3. There are two levels to this dialectical model: the conversation between the narrated Socrates and his interlocutors, and the monologue by the narrator Socrates to his unknown audience. Beyond the dialectical model is another level of dialectic: the dramatic presentation of this state of affairs by Plato to his readers. Inflexible models will of course not change and Socrates is doomed to failure, but Plato, who after all bothered to write the dialogue, appears to have believed some at least of his readers to be amenable to dialectic training.

4. The first main Thrasymachean claim is that justice is the advantage of the superior; the second is that the life of the unjust man is better than that of the just man (1.347d8–e4); see p. 43 above.

5. The eristic nature of the presentation of the categories has been analysed in detail (pp. 142–43).

6. Socrates' argumentation here has long been recognized as faulty, although it has often been attributed to a problem in the thinking of Plato himself; see, e.g., Smith (1999) 32 and n. 1 there for more bibliography.

7. The timocratic Adimantus appropriately has a low opinion of marketers whom he regards as those physically useless for any other type of work (371c5–d3). He has in mind the poor dregs of society. His desire to be considered good by his rich friends indicates that his estimation of money-makers (in this dialogue representing the class dominated by physical desires) increases with the amount of money they possess.


8. In a nice dramatic touch, Socrates ends the description of life in the simple city with the observation that the inhabitants do not have children beyond their means, in order to avoid poverty and war. It is after the last word, war, that Glauco interrupts. Glauco is throughout the dialogue the more warlike timocrat.

9. The arts patronized by the Muses.

10. It is interesting that even the upward-looking timocrat must conceive of superior life in terms of bodily pleasures due to the inability of his *logos* to pursue what is natural to it. The timocrat, however, pursues not pleasures themselves but the good reputation derived from having the sort of material pleasures associated with socially successful people.

11. See the end of Book III, esp. 416d3–417b9. Socrates would no doubt prefer Glauco to identify with the soldier class, but he allows Glauco to opt out of the extreme denial of pleasure which is their lot. The best soldier (412a4–6), or one such as him should become an overseer (a9–10), a notion which develops until the soldiers are mere helpers to the ruling perfect guards (414b1–6, just before the Noble Lie). The soldiers' lot goes downhill from there (from Glauco's timocratic point of view), and he identifies with the leaders, for whose subterfuges he and Socrates are responsible.

12. Socrates in conversation with Glauco explicitly requires the soldiers to have *thumos* and a philosophical nature (e.g., 375e8–10; 376c4–5; 411e6). Glauco accepts the connection, but this does not mean that he has a philosophical nature or understands what one is. As an upward-



looking timocrat, his *thumos* drives him to appear to have a philosophical nature. Socrates is working on Glauco's drive for appearance in an effort to turn it into a drive actually to be philosophical.

13. See, e.g., 429a8–b3.

14. IV.423b4–10 (with Adimantus).

15. X.592a10–b1. Socrates suggests that it is a model (*paradeigma*) laid up in heaven (b2–3). I argue that it is only a distorted analogy for the good (aristocratic) soul, of which Socrates is the *paradeigma*.

16. There is a difference of only one letter (Λ-H) between the majority mss. reading of ENTHIKΑΑΛΛΗΠΟΛΕΙ (“in Callipolis,” accepted by Burnet) and the variant of some more recent mss. (*d* in Burnet's apparatus) ENTHIKΑΑΛΗΠΟΛΕΙ (“in the fine/beautiful city”). Even if the latter is a renaissance emendation, it may well reflect the original formulation. An awareness of the several real cities named Callipolis may have caused a scribe to make the easy modification, whether consciously or unconsciously. Whatever the case may be, whether he calls the city “fine” or Callipolis, Socrates is still pointing out that Glauco considers the city to be fine. From this point of view, it does not matter which reading one prefers. There is, however, a problem with calling this city Callipolis. It has until now been convenient in the literature to accept the appellation Callipolis, but following the present analysis it seems to me that the city is most appropriately and meaningfully to be regarded as aristocratic (or kingly). This suggests that Socrates does not actually call the city Callipolis, but rather describes the aristocratic (or kingly) city as fine/beautiful.

17. At that point, Socrates exploits the argument with Thrasymachus concerning the ruler in the strict sense to begin to draw Glauco the timocrat into the conversation.

18. Interestingly, it is Glauco who, at the beginning of his challenge (357c2), introduces the verb τὸ φρονεῖν (*to phronein*, “being prudent”), when he places it in the second category of goods, along with seeing and being healthy. Glauco, as we have seen for other reasons (pp. 142–43), seems to be repeating Thrasymachus: the sophist would have regarded being prudent as a sort of worldly wisdom, to be equated with injustice. Socrates alludes to this colloquial negative sense immediately after having declared prudence to be the eternal faculty of the soul, as opposed to other virtues which come to be when the soul is embodied (see p. 115 above): prudence is used by worthless *sophoi* in pursuit of bad ends (VII.518d9–519a6).

19. The city is healthy and true; the prudence intended here would be a virtue and not a vice.

20. Cf. Plato, *Meno* 88c1–d3, where *phronēsis* is only positive, the opposite of *aphrosunē*, and is the virtue without which none of the other virtues or psychic faculties would be beneficial. Some half century after Plato's death, Zeno of Citium defined every virtue in terms of *phronēsis*; see Plutarch, *De St. Rep.* 1034C; *De Virt. Mor.* 441A (=SVF I. 200–201).



21. The importance of prudence in a dialogue purportedly to do with the four cardinal virtues may be judged by the frequency of the appearance of *phronēsis* and cognates in the dialogue: φρόνησις 431d1, 432a5, 433d1, 461a2, 496a8, 505b6, 9, c2, 559b11, 571c9, 582a5, d4, e7, 586a1, 591b5, 603a12, 621a7, c5 (six lines from the very end of the dialogue, together with justice); φρόνημα 411c6, 494d2, 567a5, 573c1; φρόνιμος 348d3, 349d3, 6, e3, 4, 6, 381a3, 412c12, 450d10, 521b8, 530c1, 567c1, 583a5, b4, 586d7, 590d4, 604e2; ἄφρων 349e3, 5, 6, 378a3, 452d8, 598c2, [607b7]; φρονέω 357c2, d1, 505b2, 3, 518e2, 572a6, 582c3.

22. Aristotle criticizes the community of women and children at face value, as if this is Socrates', and hence Plato's, own view; see *Politics* II. 1261a2ff.

23. In Book VIII, Socrates (again in conversation with Glauco) will liken the timocratic constitution somewhat superficially to the Cretan and Spartan constitutions (544c1–3); cf. p. 73, n. 9 above. Glauco (less so, the downward-looking timocrat, Adimantus) has a penchant for the militaristic life.

24. 452d4–6: τὸ ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς δὴ γελοῖον ἐξερρήνυ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μνησθέντος ἀρίστου—literally, “the ridiculous in the eyes was removed by the revealed-in-the-*logoi* best.” The use of *logoi* is ambiguous as it could refer to the reasonings of a wise man or the rhetoric which timocrats love to hear. On the notion that the Many form their opinions based solely on their senses and not on reason, cf. Ludlam (1991) 167–169, 175, 181.

25. For a discussion of the various deceptions, including the “Noble Lie” and the conjugal lottery, see pp. 156–57 above.



26. That is to say, the notion is overtly no longer ridiculous to Glauco.

27. All three waves are initially notions ridiculous to a male timocrat in particular, offending as they do his sense of physical and social superiority. The anachronistically labelled feminist and chauvinist remarks in one and the same dialogue have inevitably fueled the modern debate over Plato's feminist credentials. So far as the dialogue is concerned, men and women have the same range of psychic constitutions.

28. In true timocratic style, Adimantus does not object to the conclusions about the philosopher which Socrates and Glauco have just reached ("no one could object"), but speaks for the audience whom he presents as uncomfortable with the results of the questioning and answering; it would appear that Adimantus regards dialectic and its gradual accumulation of small errors as responsible for the great discrepancy between the picture of an intelligent philosopher emerging from the discussion and the perceived worthlessness of actual philosophers to their cities in everyday life (487b1–d5).

29. The later account of degenerate types in Book VIII incidentally makes the son of the king/aristocrat none other than the timocrat. The aristocrat is the philosopher.

30. The promise of future social acceptability for what is currently ridiculous is a crucial factor in persuading the timocrats to adopt a controversial notion.

31. 503b4–5: νῦν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν τετολήμῃσθω εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τοὺς ἀκριβεστάτους φύλακας φιλοσόφους δεῖ καθιστάναι. "Guards in the strictest sense": lit. "the most accurate guards." The phrase recalls the eristic debate between Thrasymachus and Socrates (see esp. p. 54 n. 51 and p. 39 above); in light of that earlier debate, the claim may be understood (at least by some of the participants) to mean that guards, inasmuch as they are guards, are necessarily philosophers, but when they fail at their duty as guards, they are neither guards nor philosophers.

32. 503d8–9: ἢ μήτε παιδείας τῆς ἀκριβεστάτης . . . μήτε τιμῆς μήτε ἀρχῆς.

33. 503e1–504a8: βασιανιστέον δὴ ἐν τε οἷς τότε ἐλέγομεν πόνοις τε καὶ φόβοις καὶ ἡδοναῖς, καὶ ἐτι δὴ ὁ τότε παρεῖμεν νῦν λέγομεν, ὅτι καὶ ἐν μαθήμασι πολλοῖς γυμνάζειν δεῖ, σκοποῦντας εἰ καὶ τὰ μέγιστα μαθήματα δυνατὴ ἔσται ἐνεργεῖν εἴτε καὶ ἀποδειλιάσει, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀποδειλιῶντες. πρέπει γέ τοι δὴ, ἔφη, οὕτω σκοπεῖν. ἀλλὰ ποῖα δὴ λέγεις μαθήματα μέγιστα; μνημονεύεις μὲν που, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι τριττὰ εἶδη ψυχῆς διαστησάμενοι συμβιβάζομεν δικαιοσύνης τε πέρι καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ σοφίας ὁ ἕκαστον εἶη. μὴ γὰρ μνημονεύων, ἔφη, τὰ λοιπὰ ἂν εἶην δίκαιος καὶ ἀκούειν.

34. The adjective δυνατὴ ("able") is feminine; what it is describing needs to be supplied.

35. Even assuming for the sake of argument that Glauco, the upward-looking timocrat, actually is steadfast and quick-witted, he too is concerned only with appearance, while a dialectician is concerned with truth/reality. The combination of steadfastness and mental prowess emphasized by Socrates may well be a necessary condition for dialectic thought, but it is not sufficient.

36. 435d3: ἄλλη γὰρ μακροτέρα καὶ πλείων δόδος ἢ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἄγουσα.

37. 504b1–8: ἐλέγομέν που ὅτι ὡς μὲν δυνατὸν ἦν κάλλιστα αὐτὰ κατιδεῖν ἄλλη μακροτέρα εἶη περίοδος, ἣν περιελθόντι καταφανῆ γίγνοιτο, τῶν μέντοι ἐμπροσθεν προειρημένων ἐπομένας ἀποδείξεις οἷόν τ' εἶη προσάψαι. καὶ ὑμεῖς ἐξαρκεῖν ἔφατε, καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἐρρήθη τὰ τότε τῆς μὲν ἀκριβείας, ὡς ἐμοὶ ἐφαίνετο, ἔλλιπῆ, εἰ δὲ ὑμῖν ἀρεσκόντως, ὑμεῖς ἂν τοῦτο εἶποιτε; ἀλλ' ἐμοίγε, ἔφη, μετρίως ἐφαίνετο μὴν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις. I punctuate Socrates' final sentence as a question.

38. 504d2–e6: . . . ἦ, ὁ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, τοῦ μεγίστου τε καὶ μάλιστα προσήκοντος μαθήματος ἐπὶ τέλος οὐποτε ἤξει. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα, ἔφη, μέγιστα, ἀλλ' ἐτι τι μείζον δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ὧν διήλομεν; καὶ μείζον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων οὐχ ὑπογραφὴν δεῖ ὥσπερ νῦν θεάσασθαι, ἀλλὰ τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀπεργασίαν μὴ παριέναι. ἢ οὐ γελοῖον ἐπὶ μὲν ἄλλοις σμικροῦ ἀξίους πᾶν ποιεῖν συντεινομένους ὅπως ὅτι ἀκριβέστατα καὶ καθαρῶτατα ἔξει, τῶν δὲ μεγίστων μὴ μεγίστας ἀξιοῦν εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἀκριβείας; καὶ μάλᾳ, ἔφη, [ἀξίον τὸ διανόημα]· ὁ μέντοι μέγιστον μάθημα καὶ περὶ ὅτι αὐτὸ λέγεις, οἶει τιν' ἂν σε, ἔφη, ἀφεῖναι μὴ ἐρωτήσαντα τί ἐστίν.

39. At this point, the Good, the subject of the three analogies, comes to the fore; but its connection with the four virtues and the notion of the circuit are dropped from the discussion.

40. The connection between prudence and the four virtues has already been hinted at earlier; see p. 176 above.



41. The Sun Analogy (508a9–509d4) and the Divided Line Analogy (509d6–511e5) bring Book VI to a close, while the Cave Analogy (514a1–517b7) opens Book VII.

42. The father-son analogy for the relationship between the Good and the Fine also appears in *Hippias Major*, where, perversely, the role of the Good is reversed, with the Fine presented as the father of the Good; see Ludlam (1991) 130.

43. Nor are the earlier remarks about the Good—including the *idea* of the Good—unfamiliar to Adimantus, who, according to Socrates, has heard them often (504e7–505a3), but Adimantus is not given an opportunity to confirm this.

44. Plato himself was aware; cf. *Timaeus* 67a7–b5.

45. Glauco agrees, but he should have questioned this. According to the previous argument, the sun is the cause not of sight but of light, the noble link between previously existing sight and visible things.

46. Since this account precedes the city-soul analogies in Book VIII where the son is more degenerate than the father, there is no reason for Glauco to suppose that the sun is constitutionally worse than the Good, but the comparison may be considered by the dialectical reader.

47. It has helped misdirect generations of students into thinking that Plato believed in a “World of Ideas” somewhere other than here.

48. Light was established as noble, but that was only to exalt sight above all other senses. It now serves the account to exalt sunlight at the expense of light in general, and the former concept of light in general being noble would now only detract from this purpose.

49. It is true that an object will be seen less well in light weaker than daylight, other things being equal. However, an object may be better perceived at night if, for example, it had been at a distance in the daytime but is now closer and viewable from many aspects.

50. 508d4–9: οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὧδε νόει· ὅταν μὲν οὐ καταλάμπει ἀλήθειά τε καὶ τὸ ὄν, εἰς τοῦτο ἀπερείσηται, ἐνόησέν τε καὶ ἔγνω αὐτὸ καὶ νοῦν ἔχειν φαίνεται· ὅταν δὲ εἰς τὸ πῶ σκότῳ κεκραμένον, τὸ γιγνόμενον τε καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, δοξάζει τε καὶ ἀμβλυώττει ἄνω καὶ κάτω τὰς δόξας μεταβάλλον, καὶ ἔοικεν αὐτὸ νοῦν οὐκ ἔχοντι.

51. In most contexts it would suffice to translate: “it appears to have intelligence”; in the present context, however, the verb φαίνεται would seem to be used consciously with some of its older and brighter connotations, e.g. “its having intelligence shines.”

52. 509a7–8 “For *you* are certainly not saying that it is pleasure” (οὐ γὰρ δῆπου σύ γε ἡδονὴν αὐτὸ λέγεις). Anything to do with learning or hard thinking is not pleasurable for the timocrat.

53. Socrates uses both the verbal substantive “the to-be” = “Being” and the abstract noun *ousia*, “Being.”

54. Visible things do not actually come to be because of the sun; the sun is, however, as Socrates observes, a factor in the nourishment and growth of living things. An unreflecting countryman might accept the claim that the sun is responsible for the coming to be of visible things only if his attention is drawn to and fixed upon the appearance of new living things with the arrival of the sun in the springtime. Nourishment and growth are added to the claim precisely to achieve this purpose.

55. It should be recalled that the sun has been presented as the offspring of the Good, and as such it must have come to be.

56. 509d6–511e5.



57. Socrates is playfully correcting Glauco who appeared to attribute the excess to Apollo; not Apollo, but Glauco, is responsible for Socrates’ excess. Glauco, being timocratic, may take this as a compliment.

58. 511b3–4: τὸ τοίνυν ἕτερον μάνθανε τιμῆμα τοῦ νοητοῦ λέγοντά με τοῦτο οὐ αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος ἄπτεται τῆ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμει.

59. 511c4–6: . . . βούλει διορίζειν σαφέστερον εἶναι τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιστήμης τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ νοητοῦ θεωρούμενον ἢ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν καλουμένων.

60. That the two middle parts of the line are equal may be proved geometrically (geometry is emphasized in this passage: 511b1, d3), but an algebraic proof will suffice here:

(1) $A < B, C < D$ [given] (2) $A/B = C/D = (A+B)/(C+D)$ [given] (3) $A/(A+B) = C/(C+D)$ [given] (4) $A/C = (A+B)/(C+D)$ [multiply (3) by $(A+B)/C$] (5) $A/C = A/B$ [(4)=(2) $(A+B)/(C+D)$ common] (6) $B = C$ [multiply (5) by BC/A] QED



61. The Cave Analogy (514a1–517b7) is followed by a long explication which continues almost to the end of Book VII (541b6). The end of the apparent digression of Books V–VII also completes the account of the aristocratic city and man begun in Book II. I shall not discuss the Changeling here, but see the earlier discussion on p. 157 above.

62. 514a1–2: μετὰ ταῦτα δὴ, εἶπον, ἀπέικασον τοιοῦτῳ πάθει τὴν ἡμετέραν φύσιν παιδείας τε περὶ καὶ ἀπαιδευσίας. Later in the Cave Analogy, Socrates tells Glauco to intelligize (516e3) the descent back into the cave of one who has seen the sun.

63. 523a1–3: κινδυνεύει τῶν πρὸς τὴν νόησιν ἀγόντων φύσει εἶναι ὧν ζητοῦμεν, χρῆσθαι δ' οὐδείς αὐτῷ ὀρθῶς, ἐλκτικῶ ὄντι παντάπασι πρὸς οὐσίαν.

64. 524c3–4: μέγα μὴν καὶ ὄντι καὶ μικρὸν ἐώρα, φαμέν, ἀλλ' οὐ κεχωρισμένον ἀλλὰ συγκεχυμένον τι.

65. 524c6–8: διὰ δὲ τὴν τοῦτου σαφὴν εἶναι μέγα αὖ καὶ μικρὸν ἡ νόησις ἠναγκάσθη ἰδεῖν, οὐ συγκεχυμένα ἀλλὰ διωρισμένα, τούναντίον ἢ 'κεῖνη. As we shall soon see, Socrates also uses the language of compulsion in his description of the released prisoner's ascent to the cave entrance, p. 197 below.

66. 515a4: ἄτοπον, ἔφη, λέγεις εἰκόνα καὶ δεσμώτας ἀτόπους.

67. The Greek word I have translated as “absurd” literally means “placeless” and may be understood as “out of place” or “strange.”

68. 515a5–b1: ὁμοίους ἡμῖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· τοὺς γὰρ τοιοῦτους πρῶτον μὲν ἑαυτῶν τε καὶ ἀλλήλων οἶε ἂν τι ἐώρακεν ἄλλο πλὴν τὰς σκιάς τὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς εἰς τὸ καταντικρὺ αὐτῶν τοῦ σπηλαίου προσπιπτούσας; πῶς γάρ, ἔφη, εἰ ἀκινήτους γε τὰς κεφαλὰς ἔχειν ἠναγκασμένοι εἶεν διὰ βίου.

69. I have found no illustration of the cave in which the shadows of the captives themselves are projected onto the wall, which, so far as it goes, is as it should be; but the discrepancy with Socrates' account is not commented upon, presumably because it is considered irrelevant to the philosophical point of the analogy.

70. Socrates includes a quote from Homer (516d5–d = *Od.* xi. 489–90). Glauco does not notice that this was the very first example of lines to be expunged from existing poetry in Book III (386c5–6); cf. p. 215 below. They were to be expunged because of their negative portrayal of death. Glauco may have forgotten the censorship, but he may well have caught the implication that such a life in the cave would be tantamount to a wretched afterlife in Hades.

71. 519d8–9: ἔπειτ', ἔφη, ἀδικήσομεν αὐτούς, καὶ ποιήσομεν χειρὸν ζῆν, δυνατὸν αὐτοῖς ὄν ἄμεινον. Burnet punctuates this line as a question.

72. 521b7–11: τίνας οὖν ἄλλους ἀναγκάσεις ἰένα ἐπὶ φυλακῆν τῆς πόλεως ἢ οἱ περὶ τούτων τε φρονιμώτατοι δι' ὧν ἄριστα πόλις οἰκεῖται, ἔχουσι τε τιμὰς ἄλλας καὶ βίον ἄμεινον τοῦ πολιτικοῦ; οὐδένας ἄλλους, ἔφη.

73. Even Socrates' eristic arguments against Thrasymachus' slogan in Book I imply or openly claim that the ruler is superior despite showing that the ruler acts to the advantage of the ruled.

74. A somewhat intellectually active Glauco would not wish to go down himself, were he to recall that attempting to release captives incurs the risk of ridicule (517a2), not to mention death (a6).

75. In the simple city where everyone cooperates, there are no rulers, and no one is superior to anyone else.

76. Among those we have not touched upon in this chapter are warfare and extravagance, both providing opportunities for one to appear superior.

77. The modern debate over Plato's attitude towards women has been fueled for the most part by readings of the contradictory statements made by characters in various dialogues, but particularly in this dialogue. If my interpretation is correct, this dialogue may tell us something about Plato's attitude towards the human soul, but not whether Plato was a feminist or a chauvinist.

78. I have identified the puppeteers with the manipulators of timocrats in this dialogue: the conventional aristocrats (parents and poets); tyrants (Thrasymachus and his ilk); and an unconventional aristocrat (Socrates). See p. 196 above.

79. Not that Socrates actually does not know; he wishes Glauco to consider critically all opinions expressed, rather than accept them all indiscriminately.



80. The manufacturing of discrepancies means that even the apparent social ineptitude of current philosophers is later explained as the temporary blinding of the politically adept philosopher descending from the sunlight to the darkness of the cave. It would be wrong to attempt to establish one consistent position merely from what Socrates says.

81. The timocrat's infatuation with appearing good is the reason why he can be tempted by the Good, especially one as glorious and honorable as Socrates dangles before him; but his very infatuation with appearances is also the reason why he cannot grasp the Good, if only because there is no good reputation to be gained from thinking. Yet no one can ever grasp a concept simply by accepting what someone else says, and this is compounded by the fact that the portrayal of the Good presented by Socrates is not all that accurate, to say the least.

